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Abstract 
Competitive Authoritarianism: Examining Satisfaction with Democracy and Perception of 
Voting Efficacy in Turkey  
 
Caroline Smith, BPhil 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2018 
 
 
 
 
Since the turn of the century, scholars have noticed a worrying trend of democratic 
backsliding. Countries around the world are becoming more authoritarian with public support, 
which is manifesting itself in the proliferation of hybrid regimes. This study focuses on one type 
of hybrid regime – competitive authoritarianism – which maintains semi-democratic elections that 
are unfair and unfree. To better understand who votes for authoritarian leaders and why, I examine 
Turkey, which has been a competitive authoritarian regime since 2014. Using survey data, this 
paper looks at how people’s perception of democracy and voting efficacy changed between 2011 
and 2015. I find that satisfaction with democracy decreased, perceptions of voting efficacy 
increased, and more religious individuals were more dissatisfied with democracy than their less 
religious counterparts. To explain these findings, I examine the effects of patronage politics, 
security concerns, religious cleavages, and a struggling economy in fostering popular support for 
Erdoğan’s regime. I conclude by briefly comparing Turkey with Russia, which also transitioned 
from a relatively democratic country to an authoritarian one. These results and comparison have 
important consequences for the future of democracy. High voting efficacy in undemocratic 
countries could prevent individuals from demanding a more transparent, responsive democracy 
and allow authoritarianism to thrive. 
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1.0 Introduction  
Democracy in the world is retreating, and authoritarianism is rising. According to Freedom 
House, since 2006 there has been a deterioration of democracy on a global level not seen for over 
40 years. This is a reversal of the democratic trend seen in the twentieth century post-Cold War. 
In 1975, only 25% of countries in the world were considered “Free” by the Freedom House Index, 
and this number increased to 45% by 2000. Many political scientists during the third wave of 
democracy expected this trend to continue as more countries joined the free market. There was 
also the generally accepted belief that incorporation into the global capitalist economy leads to 
democratization. Furthermore, by the end of the twentieth century, wide use of the Internet was 
seen as an indicator that democratization would continue, as access to information made 
censorship difficult and grassroots movements easier. And yet, these factors have not resulted in 
increased democracy, but have, instead, resulted in a trend of decreasing democracy. Why do we 
see this phenomenon? It is evident this is a global phenomenon because it is not limited to a 
geographical region. The Eastern European country of Ukraine, the Asian country of Afghanistan, 
the South American country of Venezuela, and the African country of Ethiopia indicate how 
degraded democracy has become a global trend (Puddington 2017).  
The deterioration of democracy is creating “hybrid” regimes, which exist in the grey area 
between democracy and authoritarian.  These hybrid regimes are permitting elections, but elections 
are manipulated to allow regimes to consolidate power while maintaining legitimacy. Regimes 
have also been using electoral manipulation and nontraditional coup d’états to facilitate democratic 
backsliding (Bermeo 2016). Many countries that are engaging in authoritarian behavior were 
young democracies that transitioned to democracy during the third wave after 1989 (Erdmann 
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2011). Furthermore, there is popular support for these regimes as authoritarian-leaning parties are 
being elected (Waldner and Lust 2018). While most academics agree that democratic backsliding 
is happening, Levitsky and Way (2015) disagree with the assessment that democracy is declining 
and instead argue democracy is still flourishing. Schmitter (2015) agrees with Levitsky and Way 
(2015) and argues that democracy is not in decline but rather is transforming to a new type of 
democracy, illiberal democracy.  
One type of hybrid regime is competitive authoritarianism, which, according to Levitsky 
and Way (2002, p. 52) is defined as a regime that uses democratic institutions to exercise authority 
but fails to meet minimum requirements to qualify as a democracy. Freedom House examines 
Russia and Hungary as two examples of competitive authoritarian regimes because of their attacks 
on the media and other institutions that provide transparency and accountability. Russia has 
injected its media with inaccurate information to support the regime’s agenda; for example, 
common in the Russian news are stories asserting that U.S. policies encourage the spread of 
homosexuality. Media in Russia is no longer a place for diverse opinions, but rather a mouthpiece 
for the regime to spread its viewpoint. Competitive authoritarian regimes are also more likely when 
institutions like the judiciary, the media, and others are not inherently strong, and an authoritarian-
leaning party can continue weakening these institutions. One example of this practice occurred 
when Hungary’s government, which is controlled by the political party Fidesz, reformed the 
judiciary to narrow its scope of power and allow the party to appoint most of the judges. Hungary’s 
government took a relatively weak institution and further undermined its independence and ability 
to check the legislature in order to consolidate its power (Puddington 2017).  
Turkey is yet another major example of a country that has experienced democratic 
backsliding. Indicators of liberalization, such as freedom of expression, rule of law, and freedom 
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of assembly have all declined since 2006. Turkey transitioned into a competitive authoritarian state 
in 2014 as the result of changes in the judiciary, military, legislature, media, and electoral process. 
Two viewpoints prevail in the Turkish case. Some argue that with the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP), which has controlled Turkey’s government since 2002, 
winning the presidential election in 2014, dominating local elections in 2014, and the overall 
degradation of democratic norms and institutions, this year can be considered the beginning of 
competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. Others believe it began much earlier when the AKP began 
undermining the media (Diamond 2015, 146). In either case, it is clear that by 2014, Turkey had 
transitioned into a definitively illiberal democracy.  
Despite the fact that competitive authoritarian regimes manipulate elections, they still rely 
on and enjoy a significant amount of public support. When incumbents work to bolster their power 
through illiberal means, why do they retain popular support? Why and what kinds of voters support 
incumbent illiberal party? Competitive authoritarian regimes in Hungary and Brazil, for instance, 
have garnered the majority of public and voter support despite rampant electoral manipulation. 
Considering that the majority of these competitive authoritarian regimes are given power during 
relatively free, albeit unfair elections, it is important to ask who is supporting these illiberal parties 
and why. Furthermore, in contexts where regimes are becoming more authoritarian, how have 
everyday people’s perceptions of democracy and voting efficacy changed? Perceptions of 
democracy and voting efficacy are particularly important to examine because these are two major 
indicators of the health of a democracy. Consolidated democracies encourage their citizens to 
support democratic principles and to support the regime’s implementation of these principles 
(Linde and Ekman 2003, 395).  But in the context of illiberal democracies, it can be particularly 
challenging to distinguish between support for democracy in principle and support for democracy 
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in terms of governance that is equated with a ruling regime (Ibid., 396). Both of these contexts are 
important to consider, and I attempt to examine satisfaction with democracy from both 
perspectives. Logically, we can also say efficacy, or the belief that a government is responsive to 
citizens’ wants, is another important indicator of a consolidated democracy. Not only is the ability 
to vote essential to a functioning democracy, but so too is the sentiment that one’s vote matters. 
Therefore, efficacy and satisfaction with democracy are significant indicators to examine in hybrid 
regimes as democracy is maintained in name, but not in practice. These indicators can help begin 
to answer some of the questions about voter behavior and preferences in undemocratic countries.  
This study takes up the case of Turkey to address these issues and questions, using 
secondary sources on Turkey’s politics and history and primary data on perceptions of voting 
efficacy and satisfaction with democracy. I have chosen Turkey as it is an ideal example of a 
competitive authoritarian regime. Turkey is more authoritarian than Hungary which is just 
beginning to become more authoritarian, but it is more democratic than Russia, which became a 
hybrid regime around 2000. Therefore, Turkey can help us understand how countries transform 
from a more democratic regime, like Hungary, to a non-democratic regime, like Russia. Turkey is 
also a critical country to examine in the context of increasing authoritarianism because it exists at 
the crossroads of continents and cultures. For years Turkey was characterized as the ideal Islamic 
government that the rest of the Middle East should emulate, but it has since transformed from a 
liberal government controlled by a conservative religious political party to an undemocratic 
government (Kirişci 2013). Thanks to increasing authoritarianism and repression, Turkey is no 
longer the example post-Arab Spring states should emulate. To examine how Turks have changed 
in their perception of democracy in an increasingly authoritarian country, I use survey data 
collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems from the June 2011 and June 2015 
 10 
elections to test satisfaction with democracy and perception of voting efficacy, and further, how 
these two variables are affected by respondents’ religiosity and occupational group. 
The analysis demonstrates that overall, satisfaction with democracy decreased among 
survey respondents between 2011 and 2015. Yet, perception of voting efficacy increased among 
survey respondents between 2011 and 2015. Those who identified as more religious and as less 
religious have decreased levels of satisfaction with democracy. Yet, at the same time, more 
religious individuals believed their vote mattered more in 2015 than in 2011 while those who were 
less religious did not change much in their perceptions of voting efficacy between 2011 and 2015. 
Manual laborers and white-collar individuals experienced the largest decrease in satisfaction with 
democracy among the occupational groups between 2015 and 2011, but all occupational groups 
saw a decrease in satisfaction with democracy. According to statistical significance tests, the above 
results are significant, but the change in perception of voting efficacy was not significant within 
the context of occupational group. 
Drawing from the analysis, one of my key arguments is that the increase in terrorism by 
ISIS (the extremist movement that brands itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) between 2011 and 2015 explains why satisfaction with democracy 
decreased. I then explain that perception of voting efficacy increased likely because the AKP lost 
a considerable number of seats in the legislature, thus allowing other parties to play a larger role 
in parliament. Furthermore, I argue that while religious individuals did benefit from religious 
legislation, this was not enough to counterbalance authoritarian policies in 2015 which is why 
satisfaction with democracy decreased among religious individuals. By looking at survey data of 
manual laborers, I also find that patronage policies put in place by the AKP have historically 
bolstered support of the AKP by manual laborers, but their decreasing satisfaction with democracy 
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also indicates that patronage politics was not enough to mitigate increasing authoritarianism in the 
June 2015 election. It appears in between 2011 and 2015 security concerns were more important 
than patronage politics, but patronage politics could explain the larger trend of support for the 
AKP.  To explain the decrease in satisfaction among white collar workers, I look to how they were 
affected by the deteriorating economic conditions between 2011 and 2015.  
I begin the paper by examining reasons why democracy is decreasing in the world. I then 
examine how democratic backsliding is manifesting itself in the proliferation of competitive 
authoritarian regimes (Diamond 2002) and why there is popular support for these regimes. I then 
turn to the Turkish case, demonstrating how Turkey has shifted to a competitive authoritarian 
regime over time and how the AKP’s relations with different social and economic groups have 
evolved. After elaborating my data and methods, I then illustrate how these trends are manifesting 
in changes in popular opinions about democracy and voting efficacy. Examining my findings, I 
turn to the Russian case to demonstrate how democratic changes in Turkey can help us to 
understand popular support for authoritarianism in other comparable countries. 
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2.0 Hybrid Regimes 
After the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the concept of hybrid regimes came 
to the forefront of discussion as many countries began instituting democratic governments that 
were unconsolidated (Diamond 2002, 25). These countries exist in the grey area between 
democracy and autocracy because they violate Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy, which 
requires fair, free, and competitive elections; protection of civil liberties; and institutions that check 
the government’s power. Diamond (2002) explains that hybrid regimes adopt many of the voting 
characteristics of democracies but lack other characteristics. He categorizes hybrid regimes as 
ambiguous, competitive authoritarian, or hegemonic electoral authoritarian. Ambiguous regimes 
fall between electoral democracies and competitive authoritarianism. They are differentiated from 
electoral democracies based on the fairness and freedom in elections. Along with systematically 
undermining the freedom and fairness of its elections, regimes also harass and, at times, even 
murder their opponents. These practices are not as pervasive as those found in competitive 
authoritarian regimes, however (Ibid., 28-29).  
Competitive authoritarian regimes have more systematic and institutionalized ways of 
undermining elections and intimidating opponents. Competitive authoritarian regimes also attack 
institutions that are not directly related to electoral processes but are essential to a functioning 
democracy, such as by making the judiciary ineffective and limiting the media to the state 
narrative. They are also defined by their competitive nature, and a significant number of seats in 
the legislature are held by the opposition (Ibid., 29, 32). Diamond (2002) distinguishes this type 
of regime from hegemonic electoral authoritarianism exemplified by regimes in Egypt and Tunisia 
in the 1990s, in which the leaders won over 90 percent of the vote. These regimes do not have 
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competitive elections, and they have systematic and institutionalized breeches of democratic 
norms (Diamond 2002, 32).  
Levitsky and Way’s (2010) landmark work extends scholarly conceptualizations of hybrid 
and semi-authoritarian regimes by explaining how regimes transition to competitive 
authoritarianism. They explain that competitive authoritarian regimes have both democratic and 
autocratic characteristics by making elections less free, less fair, and undermining civil liberties. 
They still hold competitive elections with opposition parties that function via offices, recruitment, 
and campaigning (Ibid., 7). However, these regimes create unfree elections through fraud, 
intimidation of voters, and harassment and repression of opponents. Elections remain competitive 
though, which means opposition candidates are still able to run for election, and fraud has not 
reached such levels that voter preference is completely disregarded (Ibid., 7).  The playing field is 
unfair because governments manipulate elections through ballot-box stuffing, for example, or by 
falsifying the results (Ibid., 8).  Governments also create an uneven playing field when they use 
state institutions to dominate media coverage and to mobilize voters. The incumbent might also 
use state funds for campaign purposes like Boris Yeltsin did in Russia during his reelection 
campaign in 1996, and the incumbent might manipulate the media to provide most of the 
population with the incumbent’s propaganda instead of allowing citizens to access information 
about all candidates (Ibid., 10-11). Competitive authoritarian regimes violate civil liberties more 
subtly than autocratic regimes by undermining independent media, harassing and imprisoning 
people who protest, or persecuting their critics through libel and defamation laws (Ibid., 9). In 
these cases, there still may be uncertainty as to who will be elected, but the playing field is often 
manipulated sufficiently to ensure the outcome in favor of incumbents. 
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2.1 Democratic Backsliding 
Scholars in recent decades have brought increasing attention to a worrying global trend 
known as “democratic backsliding” (Waldner and Lust 2018). They argue that countries have 
slowly undermined democracy by making elections less competitive, restricting participation, and 
undermining accountability. Regimes are doing this in such a way that elections are maintained, 
but these elections are manipulated to give the incumbent a large advantage (Waldner and Lust 
2018). Diamond (2015), Bermeo (2016), Burnell (2011), and Erdmann (2011) examine the 
nuances of democratic backsliding while Levitsky and Way (2015) and Schmitter (2015) disagree 
with the conclusion that the world is experiencing a decrease in democracy. Levitsky and Way 
(2015) believe the world was never as democratic as organizations like Freedom House argue, so 
there is not a large decrease in democracy. Schmitter (2015) argues that the world is still 
democratic, but the type of democracy seen in the world is transforming. While some do not 
believe there is democratic backsliding, most scholars agree democracy is being eroded to a 
significant degree across the world.  
Democracies have been failing at an increasing rate since the mid-1980s. Between 1984 
and 1993, eight percent of democracies reverted to authoritarianism; between 1994 and 2003, 11 
percent of democracies failed; and 14 percent of democracies failed between 2004 and 2013. In all 
of these cases of failure, the regimes were not consolidated democracies, but they did have 
relatively free and fair elections that were manipulated to the point that they were undemocratic 
(Diamond 2015, 144). Beyond democratic failures, there has also been a general trend of 
decreasing freedoms in liberal democracies, competitive authoritarian regimes, and autocracies. 
Diamond (2015) points to the decreasing freedoms in the relatively liberal democracy of South 
Korea, the competitive authoritarian regime of Ukraine, and the authoritarian regime of Ethiopia 
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to explain how this is a global trend (150). South Korea’s Freedom House scores have become 
marginally worse, moving from a 1.5 to a 2 in the 2014 report (with 1 being most free and 7 being 
most unfree). Ukraine moved from a 2.5 to a 3 in the 2011 report, and Ethiopia moved from a 6 to 
6.5 in 2016 (Freedom in the World 2011, 2014, 2016). This small sample of countries reflects a 
broader trend of decreasing freedoms in the world.  
It is evident this is a global trend because there has been decreasing freedom in all 
geographical regions since 2008 except the Asia-Pacific, which did not see a change in overall 
freedom scores (Puddington 2014, 122).  One of the defining characteristics of the global trend in 
decreasing democracy is that regionally influential and economically strong states are often the 
ones becoming more authoritarian. This includes states like Russia, Egypt, and Venezuela, which 
have experienced decreasing levels of democracy. This has been compounded by an open rejection 
of democratic principles by the leaders of these authoritarian regimes. Russia, for example, 
invaded Ukraine in 2014 and annexed Crimea in an obvious violation of the international norm of 
territorial sovereignty (Ibid., 123). President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has also flouted democratic 
norms by enabling the Egyptian courts to sentence over one thousand political prisoners to death 
(Ibid., 123).  Puddington (2014) is concerned with politically- and economically-influential states 
that are experiencing a decline in democracy, but also argues that countries that democratized after 
the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 are also experiencing increasing authoritarianism. Most of the 
states that Erdmann (2011) analyzed that became less democratic were young democracies. 
Thirteen of the states in his study had been democracies for only two to five years before 
experiencing decline between 1989 and 2008 (Erdmann 2011, 26). This indicates that while 
influential states are experiencing democratic backsliding, it is also a phenomenon found in new 
democracies.  
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Democratic backsliding is characterized today by strategic, long-term manipulation of 
democratic processes, whereas in the past, democratic backsliding happened through obvious and 
sudden methods like coup d’états and blatant electoral fraud. These methods are being replaced 
today through promissory coups and subtle electoral manipulation. Bermeo (2016, 7) points to 
how coup d’états reached an all-time low after 1995, and executive coups, in which the elected 
leader abolishes the constitution to become a dictator, have also decreased dramatically since the 
mid-1990s. Open electoral fraud has also declined significantly since the 1990s with vote-fraud 
allegations at around 12 percent in the early 1990s and dropping to a little over four percent by 
2012 (Bermeo 2016, 9) These methods of gaining power have been replaced by promissory coups, 
which involve the dismissal of a government on the grounds of restoring and improving 
democracy. The number of successful coups that can be categorized as promissory coups have 
risen since 1990 from 35 percent to 85 percent of all total successful coups. One example of this 
type of coup is Haiti’s coup in 1991, during which the military took over the country until the 
elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was reinstated in 1994. Similar coups happened in 
Gambia, Pakistan, and Fiji in the 1990s and 2000s. In over half of the countries that experienced 
promissory coups and reinstated elections, the coup members or supporters of the promissory coup 
won the election (Ibid., 9). Electoral manipulation has also transformed from blatant manipulation 
to strategic manipulation consisting of preventing voter registration, using government money to 
fund incumbent campaigns, and harassing opponents among many other strategies (Ibid., 13).  
Schmitter (2015) and Levitsky and Way (2015) argue that Freedom House data is 
misleading, and the world is not experiencing a decline of democracy. Schmitter (2015) points to 
the fact that regimes categorized as “Free” cannot become more free, therefore trends of decreasing 
democracy are more obvious than trends of increasing democracy for very democratic countries. 
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Democracies are transforming by using relatively new democratic tools such as referendums and 
participatory budgeting. While the results of referendums are not always implemented, they offer 
citizens a direct way to express their preferences to the government. Participatory budgeting is 
another tool recently used by many governments, including first by Brazil, which involves the 
selection of citizens to debate certain parts of how the government’s budget should be allocated. 
This is another tool that countries are using to get direct input from citizens on economic matters. 
Moreover, referendums and participatory budgeting are just two examples of how democracies are 
improving vertical accountability, which refers to how citizens hold the government accountable. 
Some countries are also improving horizontal accountability, which refers to the government’s 
internal mechanisms of maintaining accountability, through institutions like independent 
regulatory agencies to regulate banking, transportation, and public health (Schmitter 2015, 41).  
These changes show that while the indicators Freedom House is looking at to judge democracy 
may be decreasing, there are potentially other ways in which countries are maintaining democratic 
norms. Levitsky and Way (2015) also believe Freedom House Index scores are misleading, and 
the democratic optimism that followed the end of the Cold War created expectations of increased 
democratization that were unfounded. They interpret Freedom House scores and Polity scores, 
which also measure democracy levels, as remaining the same between 2000 and 2013 (Levitsky 
and Way 2015, 45). However, despite these arguments, most scholars continue to agree there has 
been a decline in democracy. 
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2.2  Why Are Hybrid Regimes Increasing?  
It is evident democracy is degrading in the world, but why is this? Waldner and Lust (2018) 
consider multiple major theories to explain this trend. The first theory they consider is the agency-
based theory. This theory argues that democratic backsliding is the result of the political elite’s 
ability to create legislation without being constrained by the executive. Elites use their power to 
undermine the checks and balances in the government so that they are less constrained by the 
judiciary, media, or other institutions in the future (Waldner and Lust 2018, 97-98). The next 
theory they consider is the theory of political culture. This theory suggests that widely shared 
norms and attitudes can account for the rise of hybrid regimes. This would mean that citizens 
respect democratic norms, and then there occurred a recent and sudden shift to respect authoritarian 
norms (Ibid. 98-99). Third, Waldner and Lust (2018) argue that political institutions can affect the 
responsiveness of the government to its citizens, the ability to check the power of one branch of 
government, and the efficiency of government. When institutions degrade, democratic backsliding 
is more likely because responsiveness, transparency, and efficiency are degraded (Ibid. 99-101). 
The next theory they consider is the role of political economy in democratic backsliding, as caused 
by high income inequality and little development in a weak democracy (Ibid. 101-103).  
Another theory Waldner and Lust (2018) consider is how the heterogeneity of citizens leads 
to cleavages such as ethnic cleavages, which can degrade democracy. Ethnic cleavages result in 
politicians trying to serve their own ethnic group at the expense of multiethnic coalitions and 
democratic institutions (Ibid. 103-105). The last theory Waldner and Lust (2018) consider is the 
international factor for the global trend of democratic backsliding and how international actors 
pressure or do not pressure states to introduce democratic reforms. They conclude that different 
states are more vulnerable to democratic influence at different times, and domestic factors are most 
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easily influenced. For example, when a state wants to join the European Union it generally is 
required to institute democratic reform. However, as is evident with Hungary, currently the state 
is less susceptible to democratic ideas than it was when it was applying for membership to the 
European Union because after accession there were no longer any conditional democratic 
minimum requirements to adhere to. This indicates susceptibility to democratic influence depends 
on the regime in control, and if there are incentives to democratize (Ibid. 105-106).  
One popular explanation for the increase in hybrid regimes is the leverage and linkage 
between democracies and autocracies on competitive authoritarian regimes. Burnell and 
Schlumberger (2010) argue the international diffusion of authoritarian norms by countries like 
Russia and China may be contributing to competitive authoritarian regimes (2). Levitsky and Way 
(2010) similarly argue that the rise of competitive authoritarianism is in part due to the end of the 
Cold War subsidies and external assistance tied to democratization efforts. Out of need for external 
support, authoritarian rulers became incentivized to institute elections, but not to consolidate 
democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 17-18).  
Diamond (2015) also discusses the decline of western democracy. He points to how the 
U.S. Congress has passed less legislation in the past few years and the inability to pass a budget 
resulting in a shutdown of the government in 2013. These issues illuminate how U.S. democracy 
is struggling and becoming more polarized. Authoritarian states have seized upon the dysfunction 
of the American Congress and lack of transparency of money in elections to further their own 
authoritarian agendas (Diamond 2015, 152). Democracy promotion has become less important to 
American foreign policy, which has been evident in President Donald Trump’s policy of putting 
America first (Carothers 2017). Authoritarian states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are receiving aid 
without incentives to implement democratic reforms. Therefore, there appear to be few negative 
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consequences of making the state less democratic, which makes the creation of hybrid regimes 
easier. 
Diamond (2015) also looks at the rise of hybrid regimes on the state level by arguing that 
one of the most obvious answers for the rise of hybrid regimes is poor governance by undermining 
the rule of law and transparency. Political elites are engaging in corruption and abusing their 
power, which has degraded democracy (Ibid. 148). Diamond (2015) examines 25 breakdowns of 
democracy since 2000 and finds that the majority occurred because of the abuse of power by the 
democratically elected regime. These abuses of power included electoral fraud and the executives 
skewing the elections in favor of the incumbent. Only eight of the 25 occurred due to military 
intervention indicating democratic failure is more often due to poor governance stemming from 
electoral and executive abuses (Ibid. 145). 
In all, scholars explain the increase in hybrid regimes by accounting for how elites use their 
power to create authoritarian regimes: the norms that support authoritarian governments; the 
downgrading of institutions; ethnic cleavages which create a polarizing environment conducive to 
more authoritarian regimes; and international actors not pressuring states to enact democratic 
reforms (Waldner and Lust 2018). Others have examined how the linkage and leverage between 
democracies and non-democracies are degrading which creates an environment conducive to 
authoritarianism (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Levitsky and Way 2010; Diamond 2015). 
Finally, poor governance is argued by Diamond (2015) as helping to explain the rise of hybrid 
regimes. Now I turn to consider the reasons for popular support of these hybrid regimes. 
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2.3 Why Is There Support for Hybrid Regimes?  
Despite an increase in scholarly attention to hybrid regimes and competitive 
authoritarianism, few studies examine the voting preferences of those who participate in free but 
largely unfair voting practices. One study done by Geddes and Zaller (1989) in Brazil found that 
those who are highly exposed to, but moderately educated about, politics are the most susceptible 
to supporting authoritarianism. The reason, they posit, is that unlike people who are highly 
educated about politics, this group is unable to look behind the popular messages advanced by the 
government to see that they are authoritarian in nature (Geddes and Zaller, 320). The researchers 
examined Brazil’s military government in 1972 and 1973 to find who was most susceptible to 
authoritarian messages. Religiosity was linked to susceptibility to the authoritarian message, and 
Geddes and Zaller (1989) explained this by suggesting religiosity could indicate support of the 
conservative values advocated by the military (331).  
One of the most popular explanations for support of hybrid regimes is rooted in patronage 
politics. Lust (2009) examines electoral support for authoritarian regimes as the product of 
competitive clientelism. By this, she means that voters choose parties and leaders based on the 
likelihood of that party or leader to provide them with resources the state should be providing. 
Patronage politics therefore undermines the democratic functioning of state institutions by tying 
state resources to a particular party or leader. This method builds an interdependent relationship 
between the voters and ruling party (Ibid. 130-131). Lust (2009) references Fatah, a political party 
in the Palestinian Legislative Council, as an example of a party that focuses more on providing its 
voters with resources instead of focusing on running on a particular party platform to maintain 
support (Ibid. 127).  
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Blaydes (2006) reaches similar conclusions about voter behavior in authoritarian regimes. 
By looking to Egypt as a case study, Blaydes (2006) concludes that the goods and services parties 
supply to their constituents encourages people to vote regardless of the ideology of the party. 
Patronage politics is most likely to be targeted at low-income individuals as well because access 
to state resources is more important to them than it would be to higher-income voters (Ibid. 2). 
Based on these case studies of voters in unfree elections, voting behavior is influenced by a voters’ 
susceptibility to the authoritarian regime’s propaganda and the ability of the regime to provide 
voters with economic benefits. There are obvious gaps in the literature on competitive authoritarian 
regimes because there is little discussion on voter behavior in hybrid regimes. There is also little 
discussion on why voters support authoritarian parties and regimes. Therefore, I turn to Turkey as 
an example of a competitive authoritarian regime to fill the gaps in the literature on how voters 
perceive a semi-democratic government. I also explanations of why voters supported the AKP in 
Turkey during the November 2015 elections. Turkey is an important country to look at in regard 
to these issues because, as I explain above, it exhibits all the characteristics of a competitive 
authoritarian regime and has major influence over the Middle Eastern region. 
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3.0 The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Turkish Republic in 1923 and crafted key 
principles that would guide Turkey’s secular politics for decades. These principles included 
promoting a strong, central, secularizing state and a strong military presence in politics (Haynes 
2010, 314). The secularization of the state in many ways suppressed religion in Turkish society 
through the closure of religious schools in 1924 and the outlawing of Sufism and Sufi tombs used 
for religious purposes in 1925 (Azak 2010, 10). The Kemalist government also reduced the 
influence of the Islamic culture in everyday life by forcing citizens to wear European-style hats 
instead of the fez in 1925, instituting the Latin alphabet in 1928, and adopting the European metric 
system in 1931 (Ibid., 11). The military has had a presence in Turkey’s politics since the Ottoman 
era and Atatürk continued the use of the military to modernize and secularize society. After his 
death, the secular establishment, which includes institutions like the military and Constitutional 
court, promoted an anti-Islamist and anti-traditionalist agenda to ensure the country continued to 
modernize along Western values by closing parties that were deemed too Islamist and changing 
electoral laws to prevent parties with extreme ideologies from entering parliament (Haynes 2010, 
315-316).  
Turkey held its first free, multiparty election in 1950, which did not result in a democratic 
government, but rather a majoritarian government run by the Democrat Party, which reversed some 
of Atatürk’s secular policies by reopening mosques that had been closed and reopened religious 
schools. Soon after, in 1960, the military staged a coup to reinstate the secular governance 
established by Atatürk. This action established a precedent for the military to intervene in Turkish 
politics whenever the military believed republican principles to be in jeopardy (Somer 2016, 484). 
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The military intervened in 1971 during an economic crisis to realign the government with 
Atatürk’s secular principles. The 1971 coup was unsuccessful because during the ensuing decade 
Turkey had eleven prime ministers and experienced wide-spread protests accompanied by 
violence. Another military coup occurred in 1980 and was followed by three years of military rule 
during which the economy stabilized, and a new constitution was written and approved (“Timeline: 
A history of Turkish coups”). While free and fair elections were once again established in 1987, 
the power of the military as well as the marginalization of many groups, including the Kurds and 
the Alevis, prevented Turkey from being a consolidated democracy (Somer 2016, 485). 
The AKP was established in 2001 by the leaders of the Virtue Party, an Islamist party that 
was shut down in 2001 (Dagi 2008, 26). After its demise, it split into two parties: the AKP and the 
Felicity Party. The AKP was comprised of more moderate members while the Felicity Party was 
comprised of more conservative members. The AKP was able to differentiate itself from previous 
Islamist parties and the Felicity Party by emphasizing its democratic conservative party platform 
and downplaying its Islamist undertones. The experience of the Welfare Party in 1997 was one 
reason AKP leaders downplayed the party’s Islamist roots. Many leaders of the AKP were 
involved in the Islamist Welfare Party that led the government coalition at the time, but the military 
forced the leader of the Welfare Party, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign, effectively 
ending the coalition. A new coalition government formed shortly after, but the Welfare Party was 
closed by the Turkish courts in 1998 (Ibid., 27). This influenced local leaders’ agendas, including 
now-President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was mayor of Istanbul (1994-1998). He was known 
for focusing on bread-and-butter issues, such as repairing infrastructure and streamlining trash 
collection rather than on religion, to maintain electoral support. The leaders of the AKP formed 
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the party around protecting human rights and democracy, which in turn helped to advance religion 
in public spaces, such as allowing women to wear headscarves to university (Ibid., 28).  
The AKP was elected in 2002 and won the majority of seats in parliament. They were 
elected on a platform that focused on improving the economy with IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) reforms, as well as improving human rights to gain European Union membership (Öniş 
2015, 23). As Öniş (2015) explains, the AKP’s rule can be split into three distinct phases. The first 
phase consisted of when it was elected in 2002 and lasted until 2007. During this period, leaders 
focused on economic growth as well as democratic reform, including reordering the military and 
promoting minority rights for the Kurds in an effort to comply with EU accession standards. 
Kurdish rights became less important in later years to the AKP as hopes for EU membership 
dwindled.  
The second phase beginning in 2007, was defined by a more assertive foreign policy in the 
Middle East (Öniş 2015, 23). Domestically, the AKP tried to tackle the long-standing armed 
conflict (1984-present) between the PKK, a Kurdish political and militant group, and the 
government over the issue of Kurdish rights. In 2007, the government initiated secret negotiations 
with the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The negotiations became openly official in 
2009, with a new ceasefire agreement under an initiative called the Kurdish Opening (Ünal 2016, 
104-105). The ceasefire ultimately failed due to the government sending contradictory signals to 
the PKK. They arrested and imprisoned more than 400 Kurds with ties to Öcalan, and, after the 
army renounced the negotiations, the Kurdish Opening failed (Ibid. 105). Intermittent fighting 
continued until 2013 when an unofficial ceasefire was implemented, but the fighting re-escalated 
in July 2015. Furthermore, democratic reforms slowed regarding minority rights during this time. 
The party was also able to survive the global economic crisis relatively well during this time 
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because Turkey did not need to accept IMF help in 2008. The government instituted some short-
term fiscal policies to address the recession, but the economy and government did not collapse like 
it did during the 2001 financial crisis (Öniş 2015, 23). Additionally, the AKP found itself facing a 
court case in which the chief prosecutor requested the closure of the party claiming it was anti-
secular. The prosecution’s case ultimately fell apart. However, the case illustrated that official 
opposition to the AKP’s policies was alive and well at this time (Dagi 2008, 25).  
During the last phase, beginning in 2011, the economy began to stagnant again, and slow 
democratic reforms were replaced with semi-authoritarian reforms, including increased 
presidential powers and decreased judicial powers (Öniş 2015, 23). The party began instituting 
more authoritarian policies in 2011, and in 2014, between the two parliamentary elections, Turkey 
was officially categorized as a competitive authoritarian regime by Diamond (2015). Other 
scholars, including Tansel (2018), agree with this assessment and point to how approximately this 
time was a turning point in Turkish politics towards authoritarianism.  The graph below shows the 
progression of decreasing Freedom Rating scores.  
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Figure 1: Turkey’s Freedom Rating 
(“Freedom in the World: Turkey 2002-2018”) 
 
One of the most influential AKP members and forces behind Turkey’s authoritarian 
policies is President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Over the course of his tenure in public office, he has 
often been described as a populist leader and portrays himself as a nationalist and protector of 
marginalized groups (Selçuk 2016, 576). Elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, Erdoğan prioritized 
both economic prosperity for the city and his religious constituents by promising to build a mosque 
in Taksim Square, ban alcohol, and close brothels. During this time, he was affiliated with the 
Welfare Party which won 21 percent of the vote in the 1995 parliamentary elections. The party 
entered into a coalition with the True Path Party, and the leader of the Welfare Party, Necmettin 
Erbakan, became prime minister. Shortly after the military intervened and pressured Erbakan to 
resign, which Erdoğan was vocal against (Phillips 2017, 9). Erdoğan delivered a speech in Siirt, 
Istanbul, which included a poem calling for individuals to mobilize against the closure using 
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religious imagery. He was convicted and sent to jail for using religion to provoke hatred and was 
therefore barred from becoming prime minister when the AKP won the parliamentary election in 
2002. Erdoğan circumvented this by running in a special election in 2003 in the Siirt district which 
had voting irregularities during the 2002 election. He won 85 percent of the vote, entered 
parliament, and subsequently took over as prime minister (Phillips 2017, 10). 
Under Erdoğan’s leadership, the party became inseparable from his influence and power 
(Öztürk 2016, 619). Therefore, when Turkey held its first directly-elected presidential elections in 
2014, Erdoğan’s success was unsurprising to most. He won over 50 percent of the vote, and unlike 
previous presidents, he continued to lead the AKP in violation of the constitution, which calls for 
presidents to be non-partisan (Ibid., 627). Furthermore, by ascending to the presidency, Erdoğan 
gained new powers, including more control over domestic and foreign policy, but due to the 
parliamentary system in Turkey at the time the presidency did not give Erdoğan far-reaching 
powers (Öztürk 2014, 110). These presidential powers were widely expanded during the 2017 
referendum and has facilitated the increasing authoritarian policies of the Turkish government 
which will be discussed further in the next section.  
Erdoğan has not only gained political power through elections. He has also cultivated a 
large amount of popular support, as evidenced by the corruption scandal in 2013 and attempted 
coup in 2016. The scandal began in December 2013 with the arrest of more than 50 Turks, 
including elected officials and the manager of Halkbank, one of Turkey’s largest banks. Erdoğan 
and his son were also implicated in the corruption scandal after a video of them discussing how to 
launder money leaked on YouTube (Taspinar 2014, 52). Erdoğan blamed an international 
conspiracy orchestrated by the U.S. and Israel for the corruption scandal, and his supporters clearly 
believed him. A few months later in 2014, they elected Erdoğan president (Ibid., 55). Resistance 
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to an attempted coup on July 15th, 2016 also highlighted the popular support Erdoğan and the 
AKP enjoy. That night, Erdoğan told his supporters to go to the streets to defy the military-imposed 
curfew. Of the supporters who opposed the military, almost 300 died and over 2,000 were injured 
when soldiers fired at them (Taş 2018, 5). The amount of popular mobilization against the military 
coup was unprecedented in Turkish history, and this popular mobilization against the coup was 
one of the key reasons for its failure (Esen and Gumuscu 2017, 63). 
3.1 Turkey as a Competitive Authoritarian State  
Esen and Gumuscu (2016) argue Turkey is a competitive authoritarian regime by looking 
at the main characteristics: an uneven playing field, unfair elections, uneven access to media, 
unequal access to resources, and civil liberties violations. The uneven playing field in elections is 
most evident in Turkey through its uneven access to resources and media. The AKP has created 
unequal access to resources in the electoral process by using personal information on voters to 
identify those who have not voted before, or who reside outside of the country by targeting them 
with letters. The government has also used state employees to undermine the opposition by 
removing opposition posters and confiscating opposition election materials under the guise of them 
being anti-government (Ibid., 1588). Additionally, AKP leaders have used public funds to pay for 
state events that are actually fronts for the AKP to campaign (Ibid., 1589). The AKP has also 
created uneven access to the media because the private media is also largely controlled by the 
AKP, and state media runs more pro-AKP advertisements than opposition advertisements. This is 
compounded by the fact that media outlets that give opposition parties more airtime are harassed 
by pro-AKP supporters (Ibid., 1590-1591).  
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Civil liberty violations have also been rampant under the AKP with hundreds of journalists 
and opposition figures being jailed, including one of the presidential candidates in the 2018 
elections. Human Rights Watch published a report in 2016 documenting the increased attacks on 
the media following the attempted-coup in July of 2016. In 2016 alone, over 140 media outlets 
were closed by the government and around 150 journalists were imprisoned (“Silencing Turkey’s 
Media…”). Freedom of expression has been attacked by blocking access to YouTube, Twitter, and 
hundreds of thousands of other websites for months beginning in 2013 until mid-2014 during a 
corruption scandal involving the AKP. The restrictions on the Internet lasted until the local 
elections in March 2014, but many websites are still blocked today (Esen and Gumuscu 2016, 
1592). The government also consistently attacks freedom of assembly. One of the most public 
examples of this was the police brutality during the Gezi Park protests in 2013, which consisted of 
a sit-in to protest plans to construct a mall in the park. Police used tear gas to break up the peaceful 
protest and, in the process, killed five people and injured thousands (Ibid. 1594).  
The AKP has coopted the judiciary and undermined the military. The military previously 
acted as a check on the executive and legislative branches as a veto player, pressuring political 
parties and leaders to resign who did not follow the organization’s version of secularism. While 
the military has had a significant influence on politics, ultimately, the Constitutional Court has 
banned political parties for encouraging religious or ethnic cleavages.  The AKP first curtailed the 
military’s power by including more civilians on the National Security Council (MGK). 
Additionally, the decisions made by the MGK were reduced from governmental mandates to 
recommendations (Esen and Gumuscu 2016, 1584). The judiciary’s independence and power were 
also eroded significantly between 2011 and 2014 due to the AKP’s restructuring of the High 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu HSYK). The HSYK is a 
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governmental agency that appoints and promotes judges who rule on the constitutionality of 
executive and legislative actions. The judicial branch is also in charge of the Yuksek Seçim Kurulu 
(YSK), which monitors elections. The electoral commission became less impartial due to 
restructuring resulting in the appointment of many pro-AKP judges. Judicial independence was 
further undermined when politicians were given the ability to appoint ten out of the twenty-two 
HSYK members (Çalışkan 2018, 20).  
Two recent developments in consolidating Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s authoritarian grip on 
the country were the attempted coup in 2016 and the presidential referendum in 2017. The 
attempted coup highlighted Erdoğan’s popular support, but it also led to increased authoritarianism 
in Turkey. Erdoğan instituted a state of emergency to address the coup and reinstate stability which 
allowed him to purge his opponents and anyone who criticized the government. Over 100,000 
public servants were fired including thousands of judges, teachers, doctors, academics, and 
government officials. Judges and government workers were replaced with pro-AKP individuals. 
The purge included the jailing of hundreds of journalists as well (Yilmaz and Bashirov 2018, 7).  
The referendum continued the trend of increasing authoritarianism that began in 2011. The 
2017 referendum to the 1982 constitution gave sweeping powers to the executive via a new 
presidential system. The president has little accountability under this new system, and the 
legislature lost some of its ability to check the president’s power. With the new presidential system, 
the legislature can only question the president by submitting written questions to vice-presidents, 
who in turn submit the questions to the president. These vice-presidents are also appointed by the 
president and they can be members of the legislature. This allows the president to influence the 
legislature by making AKP members vice-presidents. Furthermore, the president can rule by 
presidential decree on executive matters, but executive matters are not defined giving the president 
 32 
carte blanche over legislation he wants enacted (Çalışkan 2018, 27). The referendum also stated 
the president could only “rule” for 10 years with elections occurring every five years, but the 
president can rerun if the election occurs before the five-year mark essentially allowing the 
president to stay in power forever if the elections occur before this time (Ibid., 28). 
3.2 The AKP’s Voter Base 
While democracy has weakened considerably in Turkey, elections remain meaningful 
because there is robust competition for elected positions. Even so, the AKP is blatantly 
disregarding many democratic principles, but has maintained its control over the government since 
2002, which begs the question who is voting for this party? One of the main groups that forms the 
base of the AKP’s support are middle class, conservative individuals. Since the end of the Cold 
War, conservatism in Turkey has been on the rise. It has been fueled by the suppression of left-
leaning groups after the military coup in 1980 as well as the overall economic downturn in which 
peaked in 2001. Conservative individuals in general prefer the economic changes the AKP has 
instituted with neoliberal, IMF policies (Kaya 2015, 52-53). While the AKP has instituted 
neoliberal reforms, it has also used these reforms to its benefit by filling the public social services 
gap.  
Öniş (2013) suggests that the AKP has been the most successful party in Turkey’s history 
in redistributing the benefits of economic growth by providing services like education, free health 
care, and housing to its voters (112). Erdoğan restructured the health care system in Turkey by 
implementing a phone and online appointment system to ameliorate often day-long wait times to 
see a doctor (Cagaptay 2017, 92).  Öniş (2015) also suggests the AKP has created a “bounded 
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community” among its voters. Bounded communities establish in- and out-group mentalities based 
on a political identity. In the case of the AKP, the in-group is bounded by economic growth and 
the material benefits the AKP provides its constituents. This concept helps explain why the AKP 
has been able to maintain its parliamentary majority even when it faced allegations of corruption 
in 2013. The party did not suffer serious repercussions from these allegations because, according 
to Öniş, the members of a bounded community are unlikely to punish its leader if material benefits 
continue to increase (2015, 36-37).  
Somer (2016) also suggests that the AKP’s economic policies have helped to sustain its 
power. Welfare and access to state resources under previous governments were inadequate and 
many people did not receive social services. This problem was especially evident in the significant 
expansion of urban ghettos called the gecekondu (Somer 2016, 489). The AKP instituted neoliberal 
economic reforms, which usually undermine traditional welfare programs run by the state, and 
they replaced the traditional welfare system with a system of patronage that relies on the AKP.  
Social services are used to reward supporters and are being distributed in such a way to blur the 
line between the state and the party. Instead of looking to the state to provide social services, 
people look to the AKP elites and supporters (Ibid., 490). One example of these social services 
includes the large expansion of the Housing and Development Administration to replace the 
gecekondu with new public housing (Ibid. 493). Similar arguments explain the phenomenon of 
support for authoritarianism as stemming from effective clientelism (Blaydes, 2006 and Lust, 
2009) Poorer voters are susceptible to this practice in Egypt because they are most in need of 
services and support, and therefore are more susceptible to intimidation techniques (Blaydes 2006, 
1). The AKP is mirroring this process through the restructuring of the welfare system.  
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In a recent study, Esen and Gumuscu (2018) also examine how the AKP cultivated support 
since 2002 by using its neoliberal economic policies as a source of clientelism with the business 
class. The AKP has used government institutions such as tax structures and debt collection which, 
when combined with their weakening of the judicial system (as discussed above), has awarded 
supporters and punished opponents within the business class (Ibid. 351). Therefore, the AKP is 
using formal institutions by selectively applying laws to favor its supporters and bring the business 
class into line.  
Furthermore, the AKP has been able to politicize institutions by making independent 
regulatory agencies part of the Turkish government, including agencies that regulated the banking 
and energy sectors and ignoring court decisions stipulating that such agencies should be kept 
independent (Esen and Gumuscu 2018, 353). Public procurement laws and the Public Procurement 
Agency were targeted by the AKP, so that contracts could be awarded with less transparency. This 
allowed companies and businessmen with political connections to be awarded the majority of these 
contracts. The privatization of public lands in urban areas by pro-government businesses has also 
been made possible through expansions to Public Housing and Development Administration’s 
(Toplu Konut Idaresi Başkanlığı TOKI) authority. By expanding TOKI, the AKP has been able to 
award public lands to party elites in the construction sector, which functioned as a form of 
clientelism and provided the working classes with jobs (Ibid., 354-355). In this way the AKP has 
garnered favor from both socioeconomic classes.  
Businessmen have shown their support for the AKP through donations to the party, funding 
charitable causes that support the AKP’s agenda, including funding schools as well as a hospital 
and embassy in Somalia, and investments in pro-AKP media. One prominent Turkish 
businessman, Ethem Sancak, publicly stated he bought Akşam, a daily newspaper, to support the 
 35 
AKP regime (Esen and Gumuscu 2018, 361). Overall, certain businessmen are receiving economic 
rent, money earned for supporting the AKP in this new patronage system.  
The AKP also included two religious reforms on its agenda when it ran in 2002 to appeal 
to a conservative religious base. They campaigned to end the headscarf ban in places like 
universities and to have religious degrees from clergy schools have the same weight as degrees 
from secular schools. In 2007, the AKP was able to lift the ban on headscarves by arguing it was 
preventing devout women from receiving an education, and it lifted the headscarf ban on civil 
servants in 2013 except for a few positions, including judges and security personnel (Kaya 2015, 
56). In 2009, the AKP changed the law to make religious schools more desirable to students by 
reversing a previous law that penalized students in their university exams for having gone to a 
religious school. In public schools, the AKP added Islamist elements by changing textbooks to 
include religious education and offering optional religious courses (Kaya 2015, 56). Erdoğan has 
also advanced an Islamist agenda by promising to prevent mixed-gender dormitories and private 
student housing to appeal to his conservative, religious base, but this has not been instituted (Kaya 
2015, 58). 
3.3 The 2011 and 2015 Elections  
In 2011, the AKP won a majority in parliament by winning 49.9% of the vote which was 
the highest percentage of the popular vote any party had won in the history of Turkey’s elections. 
This was an increase from 2007 when they won 46% of the vote (Cengiz and Hoffmann 2011, 
255). The success of the AKP in 2011 was attributed to its economic success since taking power 
in 2002 (Ibid., 264). From 2002 through 2011, the AKP was able to generate large percentages of 
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growth and in 2010 the annual growth was near nine percent (Ibid., 264). Erdoğan’s reputation as 
a strong leader both regionally and internationally is another reason for the AKP’s success in 2011. 
Cengiz and Hoffmann (2011) consider both the historical precedent of a strong man in the form of 
a sultan leading in the Ottoman-era, as well as during Atatürk’s reign as possible precedent for 
Erdoğan’s popularity. They also examine the possibility of rising nationalism and the effect of a 
strong personality in charge of domestic and international policies as being attractive to voters 
(264).  
Çarkoğlu’s (2012) analysis of Turkey’s elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011 as well as 
Başlevent et al.’s of the 2002 election provide insight into voting behavior for the 2011 elections. 
Çarkoğlu found in 2002 more educated voters tended to vote for the AKP, but this changed in 2007 
and 2011 with less educated voters tending to vote for the AKP. In 2011 compared to 2007 
ideology appeared to matter more so than economic concerns. Başlevent et al. (2005) similarly 
found that economics played a large role in the 2002 elections. The AKP’s voter base consisted of 
younger men who were most affected by the economic crisis and wanted to punish the incumbents 
for the crisis.  
Then in 2015, the AKP lost a significant percentage of the vote. According to the 
Comparative Study on Electoral Systems (CSES 2015), turnout rate for the 2015 election was 
83.9%, and the AKP won 40.9% of the vote but lost its majority in the parliament. The AKP lost 
votes among all occupations and religiosity levels. It lost the largest percentage of votes among 
farmers, white collar workers, and very religious individuals as compared to workers, self-
employed, and less religious individuals (CSES 2015). According to Kemahlıoğlu (2015), the AKP 
lost votes because of the worsening economic conditions in 2015 (458). The AKP lost votes to the 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP), a conservative nationalist party, and the Halkların Demokratik 
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Partisi (HDP), a Kurdish party. Table 1, below, describes the vote break-down for the 
parliamentary elections from 2002 until 2015 (Kemahlıoğlu 2015, 454). According to Sayarı 
(2016) voters switched from the AKP to the MHP to punish the AKP for holding peace talks with 
the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, and the HPD gained more votes in Kurdish regions (2016, 
275). The AKP did not secure enough seats to govern the country exclusively and was forced to 
make a coalition with other parties in parliament. This failed, and another vote was held in 
November 2015 (Kalaycıoğlu 2018, 21). Tables 2 and 3 reflect how survey respondents voted in 
2011 and 2015.  
 
Table 1: Parliamentary Election Results 2002-2015  
(Kemahlıoğlu 2015, 454) 
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Table 2: Religiosity and Vote for the AKP 2011-2015  
 (CSES 2011, 2015)1 
 
Table 3: Occupational Group and Vote for the AKP 2011-2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015)2 
 
Security concerns may explain, at least in part, how voting behavior changed between the 
2011 and 2015 elections. Figure 2 below, from the Global Terrorism Database run by the 
University of Maryland (2018), shows how terrorist attacks increased in 2015, peaking in July 
2015. This was a particularly violent year with 244 total deaths as a result of terrorist attacks by 
ISIS and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). As was previously discussed, the PKK has been in 
conflict with the Turkish government since the 1984 over their rights and nationalistic ambitions 
as Kurds. The conflict deescalated the early 2000s, but resumed in 2004 (Kibris 2011, 222).  
Erdoğan and the AKP focused on peace talks with the PKK, and 2013 and 2014 saw fewer deaths 
                                                 
1 “Less Religious” includes those who responded as “Not Religious” and “Not Very Religious”; “More 
Religious includes those who responded as “Somewhat Religious” and “Very Religious”; See Appendix for full results  
2 “Manual Laborer” includes those who responded as “Farmer” and “Worker”’ See Appendix for full results  
Religiosity Vote 2011 2015 2015-2011 
Less Religious  AKP 3.2% 2.5% -0.7% 
 Other 8.3% 9.6% 1.3% 
More Religious  AKP 60.0% 43.0% -17.0% 
 Other 28.5% 44.9% 16.4% 
Occupation Vote 2011 2015 2015-2011 
Manual Laborer  AKP 34.2% 26.9% -7.3% 
 Other 18.7% 34.6% 15.9% 
Self-employed AKP 10.6% 8.6% -2.0% 
 Other 12.1% 9.2% -2.9% 
White Collar AKP 13.0% 5.5% -7.5% 
 Other 11.4% 15.3% -3.9% 
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thanks in part to a ceasefire with the PKK. The PKK broke the ceasefire in 2014, which explains 
the sharp increase in attacks in summer 2015 (Global Terrorism Database). Two days before the 
June 2015 elections, there was an attack on a HDP rally in Diyarbakır and there were many other 
attacks on HDP activists as well resulting in almost 100 HDP party activists being wounded 
(Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım 2015, 62). After the June elections, violence escalated, and the PKK and 
ISIS killed over 40 Turks that summer. In October 2015, before the November 2015 elections, 
ISIS killed 103 anti-AKP demonstrators in Ankara (Cagaptay 2017, 181). Therefore, while 
terrorism may have been on the mind of voters in June 2015, it became one of the primary concerns 
in November 2015 with the sharp increase in violence and deaths.  
 
Figure 2: Terrorist Attacks in Turkey 1970-2016 
(Global Terrorism Database) 
 
A study in the U.S. found that terrorism affects voters by creating a “rally-around-the-flag” 
effect which means there is increased public approval of the president during times of crisis like 
terrorist attacks (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). Studies in Israel have shown there is generally 
more support for right-wing parties during times of terrorism because they are seen as less 
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concessionary than left-wing parties (Berrebi and Klor 2006), and voters who are in areas that are 
more prone to terrorist attacks are even more likely to vote for right-wing parties (Getmansky and 
Zeitoff 2014). A study conducted by Kibris (2011) found that Turks were more likely to vote for 
hard-liners during the most violent era of PKK violence in the early 1990s, so it can be expected 
there was similar voting behavior in 2015 with the end of the ceasefire.  
Another factor that most likely impacted the June 2015 election was the large influx of 
Syrian refugees into Turkey beginning in 2011. Syrian refugees began fleeing to Turkey in 2011 
after the Syrian government responded to anti-government protests with violence, but the number 
of refugees increased dramatically beginning in 2012 when talks between the opposition and 
Syrian government broke down. As the civil war became more violent and non-state actors 
increased the instability in the country, the number of refugees in Turkey reached almost 3 million 
(Altindag and Kaushal 2017, 4). The AKP has maintained a policy of offering refuge to the 
migrants, while other political parties like the MHP has criticized the AKP’s failure to address 
security concerns stemming from the influx of refugees. The HDP has advocated for Syrian 
refugees to be granted permanent residency status and integration into Turkey (Ibid., 5-6). This 
increase in population puts pressure on public resources and housing which often fuels feelings of 
resentment against refugees, therefore, this could have had a large effect on the June 2015 election. 
However, the AKP recovered its losses and gained more seats than ever in the November 2015 
elections. So, while the initial influx of refugees may have affected the June 2015 election, it 
appears that this crisis did not affect the November 2015 election. Other factors like terrorism seem 
to have become more important during the November election.  
The AKP was unable to create a coalition as a result of their losses, and they called for 
reelections in November. This resulted in an AKP majority in Parliament. They won 49.5% of the 
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vote giving it the majority in the parliament once again. The AKP received the majority for several 
possible reasons. With increased PKK violence in the southeast, the stronghold of the Kurdish 
HDP, turnout rate was lower. This could have been due to security concerns or voters showing 
their disapproval with PKK violence and voting for the AKP instead of the HDP (Sayarı 2016, 
274). Voters may have switched from the MHP to the AKP because of Erdoğan’s decisions to stop 
the peace process with the PKK and adopt a more aggressive attitude, thus making nationalist 
voters happy (Ibid., 276). In general, security concerns would have been even more important in 
the context of increased PKK violence during the summer of 2015. 
These voting statistics connect back to my research questions of how perception of voting 
efficacy and satisfaction with democracy changed between 2011 and 2015. As is evident through 
the examination of the AKP’s economic, judicial, and military reforms, authoritarianism is 
increasing in the country, but elections remain highly competitive because the AKP lost a large 
percentage of votes in the June 2015 parliamentary elections. By looking at perception of voting 
efficacy and satisfaction with democracy, we can better understand how democracy is being 
perceived by the general public and how democracy relies on more than just voting practices. 
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4.0 Data and Methods  
In order to answer questions about perceptions of voting efficacy and satisfaction with 
democracy and to understand the democratic institutions within hybrid regimes, I use survey data 
conducted by the Comparative Study on Electoral Systems. Surveys were conducted after the June 
2011 and June 2015 parliamentary elections. In 2011, the surveys were conducted between July 
21st and August 26th and surveyed a total of 1,109 individuals. In 2015, the surveys were 
conducted between July 18th and September 10th and surveyed a total of 1,086 individuals. These 
surveys chose participants by using the sub regions determined by the Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics (NUTS) and by pulling 20 addresses from blocks of 400 residents. The survey 
response rate was almost 53% in 2011 and 57% for 2015.  
The dependent variables examined in this study are satisfaction with democracy and 
responses to the statement “who you vote for matters.”  Satisfaction with democracy was rated on 
a scale from “not at all satisfied”, “not very satisfied”, “fairly satisfied”, to “very satisfied”. The 
response to “who you vote for matters” was rated on a scale from “who people vote for won’t 
make a difference”, “2”, “3”, “4”, and “who people vote for can make a big difference”. Since “2”, 
“3”, and “4” were not specified in the survey, I interpreted them as follows: I describe “2” as who 
people vote for makes little difference, “3” as who people vote for makes some difference, and “4” 
as who people vote for makes a difference.  
The independent variables I am considering are religiosity and occupational group. 
Religiosity is rated from “no religious beliefs”, “not very religious”, “somewhat religious”, to 
“very religious”. There are four categories of occupations “worker”, “self-employed”, “white 
collar”, and “farmer”. Survey respondents identified as “worker” if they were any type of manual 
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laborer besides farmer. They responded as “self-employed” for jobs including doctor, lawyer, and 
shopkeeper among others. Survey respondents chose “white collar” if they did not perform manual 
labor and included jobs such as office workers and managers.   
 In 2011, of the 1,109 survey respondents, 82.4% responded as somewhat religious or very 
religious while 11.2% responded as having no religious beliefs or not being very religious. 24.2% 
of individuals who provided their occupational group responded as white collar, 42.9% as worker, 
11.2% as farmer, and 21.8% as self-employed. In 2015, of the 1,086 survey respondents, 81.0% 
responded as somewhat religious or very religious while 10.7% responded as having no religious 
beliefs or not being very religious. 22.9% responded as white collar, 51.9% as worker, 8.2% as 
farmer, and 17% as self-employed.  
 
 Table 4: Religiosity and Occupational Group in 2011 and 2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Religiosity  2011 2015  Occupational Group  2011 2015 
Have no religious beliefs 12 23  White Collar 71 89 
Not very religious 112 93  Worker 126 202 
Somewhat religious 473 575  Farmer 33 32 
Very religious  441 305  Self-employed 64 66 
Refused 54 46  Refused 4 1 
Don’t know 0 22  Don’t Know 0 0 
Missing 17 22  Missing  811 696 
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I predict that satisfaction with democracy and the perception of voting efficacy decrease 
between 2011 and 2015 among survey respondents. Diamond (2015) argues Turkey transitioned 
to a competitive authoritarian regime between these two elections in 2014; therefore, voters will 
be less satisfied with Turkey’s democracy in 2015 as democracy diminished between the two 
elections. Freedom House rated Turkey as “Partly Free” for 2011 giving it scores of “3” out of 7 
for freedom, civil liberties, and political rights with 7 being the most unfree. By 2015, Freedom 
House rated Turkey still as “Partly Free” but with a downward trend arrow. Turkey received a 
“3.5” for freedom, a “3” for political rights, and a “4” for civil rights. Based on the degradation of 
democracy in the country with many scholars arguing Turkey transitioned to a competitive 
authoritarian regime around 2014 (Diamond 2015; Tansel 2018), I expect the survey respondents 
to be less satisfied with democracy. I also predict that they will feel that “who you vote for matters” 
in fact matters less in 2015 because one of the key tools used in Turkey to consolidate its 
competitive authoritarian regime was electoral manipulation. I expect survey respondents to feel 
their vote means less because of the uneven and unfair electoral playing field that was perpetuated 
in 2015 as compared to 2011.  
I predict that those who identify as more religious to have increased levels of voting 
efficacy in 2015 because the AKP instituted reforms and laws such as expanding the end of the 
headscarf ban to civil servants in 2013 to appeal to those who identify as religious. Therefore, 
more religious individuals will feel their vote matters because the government in charge is being 
responsive. I also expect those who are less religious to feel their vote matters less because these 
reforms do not directly benefit them. This compounded with electoral manipulation would make 
less religious individuals have decreased perceptions of voting efficacy.   
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While organized labor has faced antagonism from the AKP (Duran and Yildirim 2005, 
242), I predict that the survey respondents who chose the occupational groups of “worker” to feel 
their vote matters more because of how the AKP has structured the economic system in Turkey. 
Businessmen have also benefited from patronage in Turkey, but we cannot assume they are 
represented in this survey because it is challenging to reach elites. Therefore, I expect workers to 
feel their vote matters because they are voting to keep in an incumbent that is providing them with 
economic rent. I expect the other occupational groups which do not benefit from patronage politics 
to have decreased perceptions of voting efficacy because of electoral manipulation and because 
they benefit less from patronage. 
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5.0 Findings  
5.1 Satisfaction with Democracy and Perception of Voting Efficacy  
Overall the findings show that survey respondents identified lower on the scale of 
satisfaction with democracy in 2015 as compared to 2011, and they responded higher on the scale 
of “who you vote for matters” in 2015 as compared to 2011. Satisfaction with democracy among 
survey respondents decreased between 2011 to 2015.  Those who responded as "not at all satisfied" 
increased from 16.0% in 2011 to 39.8% in 2015. Those who were "fairly satisfied" decreased from 
43.8% to 26.5%. Those who were "very satisfied" decreased from 12.8% to 6.4%. These results 
show satisfaction decreased, and they are statistically significant because the p-value is zero.  
 
Table 5: Satisfaction with Democracy in 2011 and 2015 
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
Satisfaction 2011 2015 2015-2011 
Not at all satisfied 16.0% 39.8% +23.9% 
Not very satisfied 27.5% 27.4% -0.13% 
Fairly satisfied 43.8% 26.5% -17.4% 
Very satisfied 12.8% 6.4% -6.4% 
 
There is a trend of decreasing satisfaction between 2015 and 2011. As is shown in the table 
above, the percentage of people who were “not at all satisfied” with democracy increased by 
23.9%. The percentage of people who responded as “fairly satisfied” and very satisfied combined 
decreased by 23.8%. In 2011, most survey respondents were “fairly satisfied”, then in 2015 most 
survey respondents were “not at all satisfied” with democracy.  
 47 
What can account for this trend? The survey does not specify whether people are 
responding to satisfaction with democracy as a general form of government, or as the flawed 
democracy that Turkey is practicing. If we understand the survey to be indicating their satisfaction 
with democracy as a form of government in general, there could be multiple reasons for why 
survey respondents are less satisfied. I would point to the security concerns plaguing Turkey in 
2015. ISIS conducted multiple attacks on Turkish soil, and the PKK broke its ceasefire with the 
Turkish government and engaged in attacks. These security concerns would not have been as 
important in the June 2015 election as it was in the November 2015 election because violence 
increased significantly in July 2015. Even so, the survey was conducted between July and 
September 2015, so responses would have been affected by the increased terrorist threat. 
Furthermore, beginning in 2011, millions of refugees came to Turkey which is often seen as a 
security issue and resulted in violence against refugees. With increasing security concerns, citizens 
would have been less apt to be satisfied with democracy as a principle and instead perceived a 
more authoritarian government and leader who can make quick decisions to deal with terrorist 
attacks as preferable. Democracies are setup with checks and balances making legislation and 
responses to issues such as terrorist attacks slower than a system with fewer checks and balances. 
On the other hand, if we interpret the results as indicating less satisfaction with the democracy 
Turkey was practicing, survey respondents were less satisfied with democracy in 2015 as 
compared to 2011 because of electoral manipulation and the degradation of checks and balances 
in the judiciary and military during this four-year period. Because Turkey is functioning as a 
competitive authoritarian regime, the electoral and institutional changes were enacted in the public 
eye. Therefore, Turkish citizens were likely less satisfied with democracy as the government made 
the country less democratic.  
 48 
Surprisingly, however, perception of voting efficacy increased overall between 2011 and 
2015. The number of people who chose “5” on a scale from one to five with five meaning “who 
people vote for can make a big difference” increased from 57.8% in 2011 to 68.3% in 2015 while 
those who chose “4” or as I have defined it “who people vote for makes some difference”, 
decreased from 26.5% in 2011 to 16.9% in 2015. These results are statistically significant because 
the p-value is zero.  
 
Table 6: Perception of Voting Efficacy in 2011 and 2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above collapses the lowest two categories and the highest two categories of 
perception of voting efficacy to more clearly show changes between 2015 and 2011. These results 
indicate there is a trend towards increased perception of voting efficacy. While those who answer 
with “who people vote for can make a big difference” increased by 13% between 2011 and 2015, 
if we combine “who people vote for makes a difference” with “who people vote for can make a 
big difference”, the change between 2011 and 2015 is not as large (at only 3.2%). This shows that 
the majority of people in 2011 and 2015 felt that their vote mattered, but, in 2015, more people 
felt their vote mattered even more than in 2011.  
These results are paradoxical when compared with the results on satisfaction with 
democracy. If satisfaction with democracy decreased, why would perception of voting efficacy 
Voting Beliefs 2011  2015  2015-2011 
Who people vote for won’t make much 
difference 6.7% 3.4% -3.3% 
Who people vote for can make a significant 
difference 83.9% 87.1% 3.2% 
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increase? I interpret this change as derived from, rather ironically, Turkey’s increasingly 
competitive authoritarian regime structure. Those individuals who are benefitting from the current 
regime would feel that their vote matters even more because they are receiving benefits from the 
incumbent. As was previously stated, manual laborers and businessmen are benefitting from the 
new welfare system and business contracts, and religious individuals are benefitting from religious 
legislation. As the AKP solidifies its control over the state and can offer its voting base more 
benefits, these individuals will feel that their vote matters even more because they are benefitting 
from and have a major incentive to keep the party that aligns with their interests in power. But, the 
AKP lost votes in June 2015, therefore patronage politics and religious legislation was not enough 
to mitigate the negative perception authoritarian policies have on satisfaction with democracy. 
5.2 Religiosity: Satisfaction with Democracy and Perception of Voting Efficacy  
Now I turn to how the dependent variables, satisfaction with democracy and perception of 
voting efficacy, affect the independent variable of religiosity. The most extreme religiosity 
identification “very religious” decreased but “somewhat religious” increased among survey 
respondents between 2011 and 2015. Those who were “very religious” decreased from 39.8% of 
survey respondents in 2011 to 28.1% of survey respondents in 2015. Those who were “somewhat 
religious” though increased from 42.7% of survey respondents in 2011 to 52.9% of survey 
respondents in 2015.  
Satisfaction with democracy decreased among religious individuals between 2011 and 
2015. Those who responded as “very religious” and “not at all satisfied with democracy” increased 
from 4.1% in 2011 to 10.5% in 2015. Similarly, those who responded as “somewhat religious” and 
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“not at all satisfied” with democracy increased from 6.9% in 2011 to 21.8% in 2015. Those who 
were “somewhat religious” and “not very satisfied” also increased from 15.1% in 2011 to 16.5% 
in 2015. Those who were “somewhat religious” and “fairly satisfied” decreased from 19.5% in 
2011 to 16.5% in 2015 and likewise those who were “very religious” and “fairly satisfied” 
decreased from 22.3% in 2011 to 9.3% in 2015. This indicates that very religious and somewhat 
religious individuals experienced a decrease in satisfaction with democracy, while those who were 
not very religious and had no religious beliefs exhibited a negligible change. The p-value is .074, 
which is above the p < .05 threshold commonly used to assess significance. However, since some 
studies use p < .10 as indicating somewhat or potentially significant, this warrants a brief 
discussion on why those who are more religious have decreasing satisfaction at higher levels than 
those who are less religious.  
 
Table 7: Religiosity and Satisfaction with Democracy in 2011 and 2015  
 (CSES 2011, 2015)3 
 
The table above combines the two lowest and highest levels of satisfaction and religiosity 
to better show the change between the two groups between 2015 and 2011. Those who are more 
religious showed decreased levels of satisfaction at a higher rate between the two years than those 
                                                 
3 See Appendix for full results  
Satisfaction Religiosity 2011 2015 (2015-2011) 
Not satisfied Less Religious 8.4% 9.5% +1.1% 
 More Religious 33.6% 57.4% +23.8% 
Satisfied Less Religious 3.8% 2.5% -1.3% 
 More Religious 53.9% 31.3% -22.6% 
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who were less religious. This means those who are less religious, while they are losing satisfaction 
with democracy, are not losing satisfaction as much as the more religious individuals. To explain 
this trend, I look at voting patterns, security concerns, and the changing political reality of many 
religious groups.  
These results can be interpreted by looking in tandem at the voting patterns of less religious 
and more religious individuals in 2011 and 2015. More religious individuals generally voted for 
the AKP in 2011, with 60% of the total survey respondents voting for the AKP. This decreased to 
43% in 2015. Combined with the fact that more religious people are more dissatisfied with 
democracy, the June 2015 election could be viewed as an opportunity for more religious people to 
express their dissatisfaction with the democracy Turkey is practicing and punish the incumbents. 
Furthermore, individuals who identify as religious, but are also worried about security, may have 
had a loss of satisfaction in democracy and switched their vote to the nationalist MHP. As was 
previously discussed, terrorist attacks peaked in July 2015, but terrorist threats did exist during the 
June 2015 elections. The MHP as a nationalist party helped the AKP repeal the headscarf ban in 
parliament, opposed the AKP’s peace talks with the PKK, and is the least welcoming to Syrian 
refugees. Therefore, the MHP would appeal to religious individuals as well as to those concerned 
with security as it takes a hardline on terrorism and refugees. Increasing security concerns, 
combined with an increase in the vote share for the MHP in June, indicates security issues could 
have contributed to the decrease in satisfaction with democracy. Ultimately, because the AKP 
regained its majority in the November 2015 election, it seems that religious individuals perceived 
that the AKP could better address security concerns in the long-run.  
There are cleavages within the “more religious” identity that must be examined as well. 
Kurds, Gülenists, and Alevis are all groups within the “more religious” identity with distinct 
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preferences. Kurds in general vote for the Kurdish HDP party, but conservative Kurds often vote 
for the AKP (Öniş 2016, 144). The HDP ran on a platform of preventing the Turkish political 
system from changing to a presidential system and passed the 10% electoral threshold required to 
enter parliament for the first time by running on this platform (Kalaycıoğlu 2017, 25). This 
indicates that Kurds were dissatisfied with democracy in the country because they increased their 
support for the HDP and its platform to stop the AKP from establishing a presidential system with 
increased powers. Therefore, Kurds became less satisfied with democracy which is most evident 
in their protest vote of the newly proposed political system.  
Gülenists identify with the Said Nursi religious movement which focuses on using religion 
to help create a more ethical and just society (Yavuz 2018, 19). When the AKP first took power, 
the Gülenists worked closely with the AKP, and many Gülenists were appointed to government 
and military positions. The two groups diverged over many issues including negotiations with the 
Kurds, and the AKP and Gülenists began fighting in 2013 to maintain power. Erdoğan closed 
Gülenist-run schools in Turkey, and Gülenists responded by exposing massive corruption among 
AKP leaders (Ibid., 25). Since 2013, Erdoğan has purged Gülenists from government and military 
positions. Therefore, between 2011 and 2015 for Gülenists, satisfaction with democracy as it was 
being practiced in the country would have decreased significantly as the AKP attacked Gülenist 
institutions, and they lost power in the government.  
Alevis are a politically active ethno-religious community within Turkey who generally vote 
for the CHP (Republican People’s Party) and other leftist parties. In June 2015, some Alevi 
switched to the HDP including young and Kurdish Alevi (Köse 2015, 112). The HDP appealed to 
Alevi voters because they promised to address some Alevi concerns including ending the 
mandatory religion classes in school and ending the government institution of Directorate of 
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Religious Affairs (Ibid. 112, 114). Alevis in general do not support the AKP, which can explain 
why “more religious” respondents were less satisfied with democracy because Alevis would have 
disliked the autocratic turn of the country under the AKP.  
Less religious individuals, on the other hand, did not change in their support for the AKP 
much between 2011 and 2015. In 2011, around 3% of individuals who identified as less religious 
voted for the AKP and this decreased by around a half percent to around 2.5% in 2015. This 
combined with the fact that less religious individuals had little change in their satisfaction levels 
between 2015 and 2011 indicates that these individuals have not experienced a change in their lack 
of support for the AKP. Out of the 100 less religious individuals in 2011 and of the 96 less religious 
individuals in 2015, 72% voted for parties other than the AKP in 2011 and 79.2% voted for parties 
other than the AKP in 2015. In 2011 and 2015, most survey respondents who were less religious 
voted for the CHP, which did not increase its number of seats in the 2015 election. But, there was 
an increase in less religious individuals voting for the MHP and HDP. In 2011, 6% of less religious 
individuals voted for the MHP and 12% voted for the HDP. This increased to 13.5% for the MHP 
and 14.6% for the HDP in 2015 indicates that less religious individuals played a part in the increase 
in vote share for these two parties. Many individuals who were not pro-AKP saw their chosen 
party gain seats in the 2015 election. Less religious individuals reacted differently to the elections 
than more religious individuals. Instead of losing satisfaction with democracy, they maintained 
their levels of satisfaction by voting in parties other than the AKP in 2015.   
Alternative explanations for decreased satisfaction with democracy could be that the survey 
respondents were dissatisfied with democracy and wanted the country to be more democratic. I 
interpreted the decreased satisfaction with democracy leading towards support of authoritarianism 
because of the widespread popular support for the AKP which instituted undemocratic reforms. It 
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is possible that the survey respondents were unhappy with the increasing authoritarianism and 
preferred a more democratic regime to take over, but this is not reflected in the November 2015 
election in which the AKP received almost 50 percent of the vote. 
Perception of voting efficacy increased slightly only among “more religious” individuals, 
which aggregates “somewhat religious” and “very religious”, between 2011 and 2015. Those who 
were “somewhat religious” and chose “who people vote for makes a big difference” increased 
from 26.3% in 2011 to 42.4% in 2015.  While those who were “somewhat religious” and “very 
religious” and chose “who people vote for makes a difference” decreased from 11.8% in 2011 to 
9.3% in 2015 and 12.1% in 2011 and 1.5% in 2015 respectively, and those who were “very 
religious” and chose “who people vote for makes a big difference” also decreased from 23.3% in 
2011 to 19.8% in 2015, These results are statistically significant, but the p-value is .094 which is 
larger than is ideal. Even so, there is a less than 10% chance that these results are due to chance, 
therefore the relationship between perception of voting efficacy and religiosity warrants a 
discussion. 
 
Table 8: Religiosity and Perception of Voting Efficacy in 2011 and 2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015)4 
 
                                                 
4 Response “3” or “Who you vote for matters” is omitted. See Appendix for full results.  
Voting Beliefs  Religiosity 2011 2015 (2015-2011) 
Who people vote for Less Religious  0.7% 0.3% -0.4% 
won’t make a difference More Religious  5.9% 3.3% -2.6% 
Who people vote for  Less Religious  10.4% 10.1% -0.3% 
makes a difference  More Religious  73.4% 77.2% +3.8% 
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I argue the slight uptick in the relationship between religiosity and perceptions of voting 
efficacy stems from the ability to vote in the MHP and HDP. As was previously discussed, more 
religious individuals voted for the AKP less in 2015 than in 2011 as did other groups allowing 
more political parties into the parliament. Among the “more religious” survey respondents, 8.7% 
voted for the MHP in 2011 and 5.4% voted for the HDP in 2011. This increased to 15.6% for the 
MHP and 11.6% for the HDP in 2015. Therefore, more religious individuals would feel their vote 
matters more because their vote brought in a party that catered to religious individuals via religious 
reforms, and they successfully voted for other parties like the HDP and MHP when they became 
less satisfied with democracy. This would indicate to religious individuals they have a high amount 
of voting efficacy because they are able to enact change in the vote. Furthermore, as was previously 
discussed, Kurds, Gülenists, and Alevis all saw shifting political loyalties between 2011 and 2015. 
This is an example of religious individuals feeling their vote matters because they were able to 
bring in a party they wanted like the HDP or MHP. It is also important to point out that the survey 
respondents who responded as “very religious” decreased in their perception of voting efficacy 
between 2011 and 2015, but this is because there were fewer people who identified as “very 
religious” in 2015 as compared to 2011. This shows that survey respondents became less religious 
between the two years, but religiosity played an important part in mobilizing voters and served as 
an identity around which voters could articulate their preferences.    
I would argue that less religious individuals did not see an increase in perception of voting 
efficacy because little has changed for them since the 2011 parliamentary elections. They also 
generally did not vote for the AKP with only around 3% of less religious people voting for the 
AKP in 2011 and around 2.5% in 2015. With the AKP having the majority in parliament, less 
religious individuals would feel their vote matters less because who they want in the parliament 
 56 
does not have power. Less religious individuals would have seen the change in the parliamentary 
make-up in 2015, however, so why did they not experience an increase in perception of voting 
efficacy as in the case of more religious people? Less religious individuals may not have increased 
efficacy because when the survey was conducted, the AKP was attempting to create a coalition 
government and failed. This resulted in new elections in November. The political parties they 
preferred would not have been able to make any impact on the parliament with the AKP unable to 
form a coalition government, which could explain why efficacy did not change because the 
political reality did not change. And in the end, as I have discussed above, the AKP ended up 
maintaining its control over the parliament by not forming a coalition government.  
Alternative explanations for this finding could include that the survey respondents feel their 
vote matters even more in the context of increasing polarization of politics and a shrinking political 
center. A smaller political center means there are fewer moderate politicians and opinions. 
According to a survey conducted in Turkey in December 2015, the majority of Turks surveyed did 
not want to do business with people with differing political opinions and did not want their children 
to marry someone of a differing political party (Erdogan 2016, 2). This shows how polarized 
Turkish society has become and how each election seems to have very high stakes because 
partisanship is so important. Therefore, while electoral manipulation is making voting less 
democratic, people feel their vote matters a lot because they want to keep certain political parties 
and views out of government and keep their viewpoint in. 
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5.3 Occupational Group: Satisfaction with Democracy and Perception of Voting 
Efficacy  
Satisfaction with democracy decreased among survey respondents who identified as “white 
collar” and “worker” between 2011 and 2015. Those who were “white collar” and “not at all 
satisfied” increased from 2.8% in 2011 to 13.1% in 2015, and similarly those who were “worker” 
and “not at all satisfied” increased from 9.2% in 2011 to 20.6% in 2015. Those who were “white 
collar” and “not very satisfied” decreased from 9.2% in 2011 to 5.7% in 2015, while those who 
were “worker and “not very satisfied” increased from 10.6% in 2011 to 13.1% in 2015. Those who 
were “worker” and “fairly satisfied” decreased from 20.1% in 2011 to 13.1% in 2015. These results 
are statistically significant because the p-value is .0038.  
 
Table 9: Occupational Group and Satisfaction with Democracy in 2011 and 2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015)5 
Satisfaction Occupational Group 2011 2015 2015-2011 
Not satisfied Manual Laborers 22.6% 38.9% +16.3 
 Self-employed 10.9% 12.0% +1.1 
 White Collar 12.0% 18.8% +6.8 
Satisfied Manual Laborers 31.7% 21.0% -10.7 
 Self-employed 10.2% 5% -5.2% 
 White Collar 12.4% 4.5% -7.9% 
 
To explain this trend, I examine patronage politics, the state of the economy, and security 
concerns. Manual laborers and white-collar individuals had a larger drop in satisfaction than did 
self-employed individuals. I argue this is because manual laborers have more invested in the 
                                                 
5 See Appendix for full results.  
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government than self-employed individuals because they benefit more from patronage politics. 
Patronage politics, manifest in the welfare system, and the manipulation of public resources create 
a strong voter base, but these policies of making individuals rely on the AKP for social services 
and giving pro-AKP businessmen construction contracts degrades democracy. There is less 
transparency and accountability in this new system, and these groups know they benefit from the 
less democratic regime the AKP has instituted. We can assume the survey was unable to reach the 
elite businessmen benefitting from the AKP’s patronage system, so other explanations for the 
decrease in satisfaction among white collar workers is required. While white-collar workers have 
not been part of the patronage system directly, as middle-class individuals they have benefitted 
from the economic prosperity the AKP was able to generate beginning in 2002. I look to the 
struggling economic conditions in Turkey in 2015 to explain white collar worker’s decreasing 
satisfaction with democracy as the AKP was practicing it. The economy was slowing down prior 
to the June 2015 elections, but it worsened over the summer with the lira depreciating 20% by the 
November elections (Yavuz and Özcan 2015, 74). This survey was conducted between July and 
September 2015, so survey responses would have been affected by the economic downturn. 
Therefore, worsening economic conditions combined with authoritarian policies makes the 
democracy as the AKP was instituting it less desirable. Not only were citizens surrendering some 
of their freedoms under the competitive authoritarian system, but they were also no longer 
benefitting from the economic prosperity the AKP brought.  
Security concerns could also have affected satisfaction with democracy as a principle like 
it did with religious individuals. Manual laborers may have felt more threatened by refugees 
competing for jobs, depressing wages, and contributing to the rise in rent prices. Furthermore, the 
2015 survey was conducted between July and September 2015 during the most violent months of 
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terrorist attacks.  All individuals would have worried about increased terrorism, but white-collar 
individuals would also worry about security issues in the country hurting business and international 
investment. Therefore, for both groups, security via an authoritarian government would be more 
desirable than democracy not addressing these security and economic issues with as much urgency. 
This was reflected in voting patterns in 2015 as well. In the June elections, terrorism was much 
less of a concern as it was in the November elections. The AKP regained its parliamentary majority 
in the November 2015 elections because of the terrorist threats in the country (Kalaycıoğlu 2018, 
31).  
Perception of voting efficacy increased among those survey respondents who identified as 
“worker”, but overall there does not appear to be a connection between occupation and voting 
efficacy according to the significance tests. Those who identified as “worker” and rated efficacy 
at a “5” increased from 22.3% in 2011 to 35.6% in 2015. Voting efficacy increased overall which 
is statistically significant, but the p-value is .68 for the interaction of occupational group and 
perception of voting efficacy. This means there is a 68% chance that these results are based on 
chance. Therefore, I cannot draw any conclusions about how perception of voting efficacy depends 
on occupation.  
Table 10: Occupational Group and Perception of Voting Efficacy in 2011 and 2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015)6 
Voting Beliefs Occupational Group 2011 2015 2015-2011 
Who people vote for Manual Laborer 3.4% 3.7% 0.3% 
won’t make much Self-employed 1.3 0.8% -0.5% 
difference White Collar 0.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
Who people vote for Manual Laborer 44.2% 51.1% 6.9% 
can make a significant Self-employed 19.1% 14.3% -4.8% 
difference White Collar 20.9% 19.7% -1.2% 
                                                 
6 Response “3” or “Who you vote for matters” is omitted. See Appendix for full results.  
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5.4 Summary  
Between the 2011 and 2015 parliamentary elections, satisfaction with democracy 
decreased and perception of voting efficacy increased among survey respondents. Religious 
individuals saw a larger decrease in satisfaction with democracy and a larger increase in perception 
of voting efficacy than less religious individuals. Manual laborers and white-collar workers also 
saw a larger decrease in satisfaction with democracy than self-employed individuals. One reason 
for these changes is security concerns. Terrorist attacks increased significantly in July 2015 when 
the survey was conducted. Additionally, between 2011 and 2015 around three million Syrian 
refugees entered the country. In general, voters prefer right-wing parties with uncompromising 
stances against terrorists during crises, which can account for the decrease in satisfaction with 
democracy as democracy is seen as not as an effective form of governance against terrorism when 
compared to a more authoritarian regime. Other explanations for this trend include the changing 
political preferences of many religious groups including the Kurds, Gülenists, and Alevis all of 
whom became disenchanted with the AKP and its increasing authoritarian policies. Furthermore, 
the economic downturn can explain white-collar dissatisfaction with democracy.  
Increased perceptions of voting efficacy can be attributable to the increase in vote-share of 
the MHP and HDP at the expense of the AKP, which indicates that elections are still competitive. 
These results show that while people recognize democracy has degraded in the country, 
perceptions of voting efficacy remain high. This indicates that the competitive authoritarian regime 
the AKP and Erdoğan have established is functioning well because they have consolidated power 
while maintaining the guise of free and fair elections. This trend is particularly harmful to 
democracy worldwide because if people feel efficacious they will most likely not demand change 
even though we know democracy is degrading. These trends indicate that occupational group is 
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very important in Turkish politics in regard to satisfaction with democracy because it was highly 
statistically significant. It was more significant than religiosity, which indicates that occupational 
group and socio-economic status is perhaps a better way for us to examine how people think and 
feel about democracy in Turkey. This was the opposite when it came to perception of voting 
efficacy. Religiosity was significant in understanding how perceptions of voting efficacy changed, 
but occupational group was not. Within the context of Turkish politics, this indicates that religious 
cleavages are more important than occupational cleavages when it comes to voting and feeling that 
your vote matters. These paradoxical findings also indicate that in Turkey, cleavages are cross-
cutting. Thus, belonging to a certain occupational group or religiosity category has different effects 
on perceptions of democracy and voting efficacy. Furthermore, these trends can help us understand 
other competitive authoritarian regimes that enjoy popular support. 
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6.0 Conclusion  
This paper investigates the global phenomenon of increasing authoritarianism by 
examining the Turkish case. It is evident democracy is in retreat, which is resulting in an increase 
in hybrid regimes like competitive authoritarian regimes, as exemplified by the Turkish case. As 
this type of regime increases globally, democratic institutions and elections are being maintained, 
but voting remains largely free. This raises the question of how citizens of these countries feel 
about democracy and voting. By analyzing satisfaction with democracy and perception of voting 
efficacy in Turkey, this study illuminates how and why people’s opinions about these systems are 
changing. With further research, these findings can be compared to other hybrid regimes to see if 
the results are similar. 
In Turkey, satisfaction with democracy declined among survey respondents between 2011 
and 2015. This is significant because Turkey transitioned from a relatively free democracy to a 
competitive authoritarian regime between these two elections. Therefore, satisfaction with 
democracy decreased as the leaders in Turkey undermined democracy through a combination of 
electoral manipulation, media suppression, and checks and balances. While I expected patronage 
politics and religious legislation to increase perceptions of voting efficacy among manual laborers 
and more religious individuals, this was not the case. It appears these methods of generating 
support for the AKP failed in June 2015 as more political parties reached parliament and the AKP 
lost power. There were many factors that contributed to the decrease in satisfaction with 
democracy, the increase in perception of voting efficacy, and the shift in vote share between 2011 
and 2015. This included an increase in security threats from ISIS and the PKK in the summer of 
2015. Some religious groups experienced a shift in their political preferences, and others were 
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adversely affected by economy which, combined with increasing authoritarianism, resulted in less 
satisfaction with Turkish democracy. The quantitative data used in this paper would have been 
complimented well by qualitative data and would provide a more nuanced understanding of voter 
behavior. Understanding what the survey respondents think of democracy as a principle and as it 
functions in their country will also give future studies more robust results. Furthermore, qualitative 
data will help us to better understand if survey respondents feel that their vote matters because of 
increasing authoritarianism, or due to increasing polarization of politics, which I suggest above as 
an alternative explanation.  
By looking back to the arguments put forth that authoritarian leaders gain support through 
clientelism as Lust (2009) saw with Fatah in the Palestinian Authority and Blaydes (2006) saw in 
Egypt, it appears patronage politics functioned differently in Turkey between 2011 and 2015. 
Manual laborers who benefit from patronage politics experienced a decrease in satisfaction with 
democracy, and the AKP lost votes in June 2015. Therefore, while patronage politics may generate 
support, it appears there is a limit to this support. Patronage politics may explain how the AKP has 
maintained its support in the long-term though because it regained its majority in the November 
2015 elections. More research on how satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of voting 
efficacy in the 2018 election could help us understand if patronage politics is offsetting the effects 
of increasing authoritarianism.  
These results also suggest that voters are influenced by economic and social factors, as 
suggested by Waldner and Lust (2018). They examined many theories for why hybrid regimes 
have increased, but two of them, the political economy theory and cleavages theory, apply to these 
findings. The AKP as the dominant party within a competitive authoritarian regime is being 
sustained through a relationship with businessmen and the working class via construction projects 
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and a new welfare system. Yet, this patronage system was not enough to make citizens happy with 
democracy or vote overwhelmingly for the AKP in June 2015. But when confronted with security 
and economic issues, voters flocked to the AKP in November, indicating that the economy theory 
is important but not enough to explain the rise of authoritarianism. The cleavages theory can apply 
to religious voters because they have capitalized on religious reforms to maintain a religious, 
conservative base, but like patronage politics, this was not enough to prevent decreasing levels of 
satisfaction with democracy and a loss in vote share in June 2015. This is because cleavages are 
cross-cutting. Even within the religious identification there are different types of religious groups 
with distinct preferences. Again, this shows that while the economic and cleavages theories can 
provide some insight into why there is support for authoritarian-leaning regimes, other factors like 
security can help explain support for the authoritarian regime in Turkey. Furthermore, this can 
help us understand other competitive authoritarian regimes that enjoy popular support. To suggest 
how, I turn to the case of Russia under the competitive authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin 
(1999-present).  
Russia similarly has degraded its democracy to the point of being an authoritarian 
government, but like Turkey, perceptions of satisfaction with democracy and voting efficacy are 
mixed and seemingly contradictory. According to Diamond (2015), Russia transitioned to a hybrid 
regime in 2000, and it has since consolidated its authoritarian structures until it was categorized as 
an unfree, authoritarian regime by Freedom House in 2005. Even so, elections continue in Russia, 
therefore it is useful to examine it in tandem with the Turkish case because if authoritarian policies 
continue to be implemented, Turkey could be on a similar trajectory.  
President Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999 and began degrading democratic 
institutions by manipulating media coverage of elections, undermining regional autonomy by 
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appointing governors instead of allowing them to be elected, and manipulating vote counting to 
keep opponents out of parliament. These changes were enacted in the context of Chechen wars, 
and the violence and terrorism that stemmed from this conflict was used by Putin and the party he 
belongs to, Kremlin’s Unity Party, to degrade democracy. Female suicide bombers from Chechnya 
targeted metro stations, airplanes, and schools throughout the 2000s; Putin used these attacks to 
consolidate his power and ensure he could maintain this power in the future (Puddington 2017). 
Human rights abuses were also rampant in the context of the Chechen wars during the early 2000s 
with multiple accounts of Russian soldiers raping Muslim, Chechen women and ad hoc detention 
and torture of Chechen individuals. Media sources that criticized the government were raided and 
subject to sanctions, and the judicial system lacked transparency and accountability which resulted 
in prosecutors extracting forced confessions (Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: The 
Russian Federation).  
Levitsky and Way (2002) characterized Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime 
because like Turkey, it has also made elections unfree and unfair and has undermined civil 
liberties. They point to how elections in the 1990s in Russia were highly competitive including the 
1996 presidential election of Boris Yeltsin, during which he faced strong opposition from former 
communist parties (Ibid., 55). While elections were competitive, authoritarian elements remained. 
In 1993, Yeltsin shut down the legislature and called for new elections because the parliament 
opposed him. Another way in which competitive authoritarian regimes consolidate their power is 
through undermining the judiciary which Yeltsin did in 1993 when the courts ruled his closure of 
the parliament unconstitutional. He cut off phone access to the courts and removed its guards to 
prevent the judiciary from stopping his plans. Furthermore, undermining the media is another tactic 
used by competitive authoritarian regimes. And while independent media in Russia survived the 
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1990s, they were forced to not criticize the government after Putin took over. All of these measures 
were similar to the ones Turkey has taken to undermine the system of checks and balances and 
elections. And like Turkey, Russia instituted many of these authoritarian reforms within the 
context of fighting terrorism.  
Erdoğan as a charismatic, nationalistic leader has been indispensable to the increasing 
authoritarian turn of the AKP and Turkey, and likewise Putin has been to Russia. Putin, like 
Erdoğan, has capitalized on nationalism and popular support to maintain his authoritarian regime. 
Putin enjoyed popularity levels at 80% in November 1999, and since then popularity levels have 
not dipped below 40% (Foxall 2013, 136). By publishing semi-naked pictures of himself on 
vacation, he projects a hyper-masculine image of himself and reinforces his ability to run the 
country by showing off his physical abilities (Ibid., 151). As was previously discussed, Erdoğan 
portrays himself as a nationalist and champion of marginalized groups in Turkey. Similar to Putin, 
Erdoğan and the AKP also advance a masculine, patriarchal persona through gendered language 
which is especially obvious in a publication titled “My Family Turkey” which advises women to 
stay at home and cook (Ayata and Tütüncü 2008, 378). Putin and Erdoğan are charismatic leaders 
who rely on popular support, nationalist identities, and gendered personas to help solidify their 
authoritarian regimes over their countries.  
Russia reflects many of the same authoritarian characteristics as Turkey does, which begs 
the question if its citizens have similar perceptions of voting efficacy and satisfaction with 
democracy. McAllister and White (2011) examined perceptions of voting efficacy and satisfaction 
with democracy in Russia and how this interacted with perceptions of fairness in 2010. While 
Russia was categorized as an authoritarian regime by this time, McAllister and White’s results 
combined with the results of this paper can illuminate how these two variables function in both 
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types of regimes. Their study examined the effect of electoral fairness on broader attitudes towards 
Russia’s ostensibly democratic system. They found people were far more likely to be satisfied with 
democracy if they also perceived the election as fair, while the perception of political efficacy did 
not depend as much on electoral fairness. This is parallel to the Turkish case because elections 
have become much less fair and satisfaction with democracy has decreased, and as elections have 
become less fair perception of voting efficacy has increased. Therefore, in both cases it appears 
that even though Turkey is more democratic than Russia, perceptions of efficacy are less related 
to the actual fairness of elections. Therefore, democratic backsliding may be successful in 
countries that are able to generate political efficacy even if elections are unfair. More research is 
needed to investigate if other hybrid and authoritarian regimes reflect these findings.    
Russia is just one of many hybrid regimes in the world. Therefore, a systematic analysis of 
popular support for hybrid regimes is required to understand if satisfaction with democracy and 
perceptions of voting efficacy can help illuminate parts of the global phenomenon. More research 
needs to be done to better understand the motivations behind people voting for authoritarian parties 
in all parts of the world including countries like Hungary, Venezuela, and the Philippines. I looked 
at religiosity and occupational group to try to determine how perceptions on the democratic system 
have changed, but other areas that need more attention include migration. Are increased security 
issues such as mass migration contributing to democratic backsliding? Many countries facing 
refugee influxes such as Hungary have rallied around nationalist, anti-migrant rhetoric to further 
their authoritarian agendas. Anti-immigrant attitudes are fueling populism worldwide, including 
in the United States with the election of President Donald Trump in 2016 who ran on an anti-
migrant platform. The reality of migration as well as the idea of migration could be fueling the 
popular support of authoritarian parties. 
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Another area worthy of additional research is how terrorism is contributing to the rise of 
authoritarianism. Like mass migration, terrorism has been used in many countries to help elect 
populist leaders. In the United States, after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, democracy 
was undermined by the government in the name of protecting citizens from terrorist threats such 
as creating the PATRIOT Act, which allows the government to monitor and imprison suspected 
terrorists and persons of interest indefinitely. As was previously discussed, security concerns and 
specifically terrorism have been used by leaders in Turkey and Russia to justify authoritarian 
actions and generate electoral support. Therefore, the relationship between terrorism and hybrid 
regimes requires further investigation.  
In conclusion, it is important to examine the rise of competitive authoritarianism from a 
comparative perspective because it can help us understand the future trajectory of democracy and 
autocracy in a country. If we understand Turkey to be on a similar trajectory to Russia, the country 
will continue to become more authoritarian. Similarly, if we expect Hungary to be follow in the 
footsteps of Turkey and Russia, then we may better understand how the Hungarian regime will 
both undermine democracy and retain popular support in the future. It is essential that more 
research is conducted on hybrid regimes and the deterioration of democracy because very little 
literature exists on how voters contribute and react to this phenomenon. Comparative studies of 
this global phenomenon can help us understand why and how democracy is in retreat and perhaps 
result in more effective strategies for parties or international organizations to bolster democracy 
globally. 
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Appendix A Statistical Significance Tests  
Religiosity and Satisfaction with Democracy 
Model 1: satisfaction + religiosity + year 
Model 2: satisfaction + religiosity + year + satisfaction * year 
Model 3: satisfaction + religiosity + year + satisfaction * year + religiosity * year 
Model 4: satisfaction + religiosity + year + satisfaction * year + religiosity * year + satisfaction 
*religiosity  
Table 11: Religiosity and Satisfaction with Democracy Significance Tests  
 Deviance Df Delta (Dev) Delta (df) P(> Delta (Dev) 
Model 1 319.42204 24    
Model 2 148.92891 21 170.49313 3 0 
Model 3 116.75868 18 32.17023 3 0 
Model 4 15.66617 9 101.09251 9 0 
Saturated  0 0 15.66617 9 0.07419 
 
Religiosity and Perception of Voting Efficacy  
Model 1: efficacy + religiosity + year 
Model 2: efficacy + religiosity + year +efficacy * year 
Model 3: efficacy + religiosity + year + efficacy * year + religiosity * year 
Model 4: efficacy + religiosity + year + efficacy * year + religiosity * year + efficacy * religiosity  
Table 12: Religiosity and Perception of Voting Efficacy Significance Tests  
 Deviance Df Delta (Dev) Delta (df) P(> Delta (Dev) 
Model 1 120.54175 31    
Model 2 71.87684 27 48.66491 4 0 
Model 3 35.35502 24 36.52182 3 0 
Model 4 18.76478 12 16.59024 12 0.16567 
Saturated  0 0 18.76478 12 0.09437 
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Occupational Group and Satisfaction with Democracy  
Model 1: satisfaction + socioeconomic + year 
Model 2: satisfaction + socioeconomic + year + satisfaction * year 
Model 3: satisfaction + socioeconomic + year + satisfaction * year + socioeconomic * year 
Model 4: satisfaction + socioeconomic + year + satisfaction * year + socioeconomic * year + 
satisfaction *socioeconomic   
Table 13: Occupational Group and Satisfaction with Democracy Significance Tests  
 Deviance Df Delta (Dev) Delta (df) P(> Delta (Dev) 
Model 1 105.67289 24    
Model 2 50.40584 21 55.267051 3 0 
Model 3 43.84495 18 6.560886 3 0.08729 
Model 4 24.31788 9 19.527069 9 0.02107 
Saturated  0 0 24.317880 9 0.00383 
 
Occupational Group and Perception of Voting Efficacy  
Model 1: efficacy + socioeconomic + year 
Model 2: efficacy + socioeconomic + year + efficacy * year 
Model 3: efficacy + socioeconomic + year + efficacy * year + socioeconomic * year 
Model 4: efficacy + socioeconomic + year + efficacy * year + socioeconomic * year + efficacy * 
socioeconomic  
Table 14: Occupational Group and Perception of Voting Efficacy Signifcance Tests  
 Deviance Df Delta (Dev) Delta (df) P(> Delta (Dev) 
Model 1 35.778540 31    
Model 2 21.679910 27 14.098630 4 0.00699 
Model 3 14.615960 24 7.063950 3 0.06989 
Model 4 9.181195 12 5.434765 12 0.94186 
Saturated  0.00000 0 9.181195 12 0.68738 
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Appendix B Complete Results – Tables  
Table 15: Religiosity and Vote for the AKP 2011-2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
Table 16: Occupational Group and Vote for the AKP 2011-2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Religiosity Vote 2011 (n=878) 2015 (n=804) 2015-2011 
No Religious AKP 0.3% 0% -0.3% 
 Other 0.8% 2.1% +1.3% 
Not Very AKP 2.8% 2.5% -0.3% 
 Other 7.5% 7.5% 0% 
Somewhat AKP 26.9% 25.8% -1.1% 
 Other 18.7% 32.0% +13.3% 
Very AKP 33.1% 17.3% -15.9% 
 Other 9.8% 12.9% +3.2% 
Occupational Group Vote 2011 (n=246) 2015 (n=327) 2015-2011 
Farmer AKP 9.4% 3.7% -5.7% 
 Other 3.7% 4.9% +1.2% 
Self-employed AKP 10.6% 8.6% -2.0% 
 Other 12.1% 9.2% -2.9% 
White Collar AKP 13.0% 5.5% -7.5% 
 Other 11.4% 15.3% -3.9% 
Worker AKP 24.8% 23.2% -1.6% 
 Other 15.0% 29.7% +14.7% 
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Table 17: Perception of Voting Efficacy in 2011 and 2015 
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
 
Table 18: Religiosity and Satisfaction with Democracy in 2011 and 2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Voting Beliefs 2011  2015  2015-2011 
Who people vote for won’t make any difference 3.6% 2.8% -0.8% 
2 
 (who people vote for makes little difference) 3.1% 1.0% -2.1% 
3 
(who people vote for makes a difference) 9.5% 9.1% -0.4% 
4 
(who people vote for makes some difference) 28.1% 18.3% -9.8% 
Who people vote for can make a big difference 55.8% 68.8% +13.0% 
Satisfaction Religiosity 2011 2015 (2015-2011) 
Not at all satisfied Have no religious beliefs 0.6% 1.9% +1.3% 
 Not very religious 3.4% 5.1% +1.7% 
 Somewhat religious 6.9% 21.8% +14.9% 
 Very religious 4.1% 10.5% +6.4% 
Not very satisfied Have no religious beliefs 0.3% 0.3% 0% 
 Not very religious 4.1% 2.2% -1.9% 
 Somewhat religious 15.1% 16.5% +1.4% 
 Very religious 7.5% 8.0% +0.5% 
Fairly satisfied Have no religious beliefs 0.1% 0.1% 0% 
 Not very religious 2.9% 2.1% -0.8% 
 Somewhat religious 19.5% 15.8% -3.7% 
 Very religious 22.3% 9.3% -13.0% 
Very satisfied Have no religious beliefs 0.2% 0% -0.2% 
 Not very religious 0.6% 0.3% -0.3% 
 Somewhat religious 4.9% 3.7% -1.2% 
 Very religious 7.2% 2.5% -4.7% 
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Table 19: Religiosity and Perception of Voting Efficacy in 2011 and 2015 
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voting Beliefs  Religiosity 2011 2015 (2015-2011) 
Who people vote for Have no religious beliefs 0% 0.2% +0.2% 
won’t make any Not very religious 0.3% 0% -0.3% 
difference Somewhat religious 2.0% 1.5% -0.5% 
 Very religious 1.1% 0.8% -0.3% 
 Have no religious beliefs 0% 0.1% +0.1% 
2 Not very religious 0.4% 0% -0.4% 
 Somewhat religious 1.7% 0.8% -0.9% 
 Very religious 1.1% 0.2% -0.9% 
 Have no religious beliefs 0.3% 0.1% -0.2% 
3 Not very religious 0.9% 1.1% +0.2% 
 Somewhat religious 4.5% 4.2% -0.3% 
 Very religious 3.8% 3.6% -0.2% 
 Have no religious beliefs 0.1% 0.4% +0.3% 
4 Not very religious 3.8% 2.3% -1.5% 
 Somewhat religious 11.8% 9.3% -2.5% 
 Very religious 12.1% 5.7% -6.4% 
Who people vote for Have no religious beliefs 0.8% 1.5% +0.7% 
can make a big Not very religious 5.7% 5.9% +0.2% 
difference Somewhat religious 26.3% 42.4% +16.1% 
 Very religious 23.2% 19.8% -3.4% 
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Table 20: Occupational Group and Satisfaction with Democracy in 2011 and 2015  
 (CSES 2011, 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Satisfaction Occupational Group 2011 2015 2015-2011 
Not at all satisfied Farmer 1.4% 2.3% +0.9% 
 Self-employed 4.9% 6.5% +1.6% 
 White Collar 2.8% 13.1% +10.3% 
 Worker 9.2% 20.6% +11.4% 
Not very satisfied Farmer 1.4% 2.9% +1.5% 
 Self-employed 6.0% 5.5% -0.5% 
 White Collar 9.2% 5.7% -3.5% 
 Worker 10.6% 13.1% +2.5% 
Fairly satisfied Farmer 5.3% 1.6% -3.7% 
 Self-employed 7.0% 3.4% -3.6% 
 White Collar 8.8% 4.2% -4.6% 
 Worker 20.1% 13.1% -7.0% 
Very satisfied Farmer 3.5% 1.3% -2.2% 
 Self-employed 3.2% 1.6% -1.6% 
 White Collar 3.9% 0.3% -3.3% 
 Worker 2.8% 5.0% +2.2% 
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Table 21: Occupational Group and Perception of Voting Efficacy in 2011 and 2015  
(CSES 2011, 2015) 
 
Efficacy Socioeconomic 2011 2015 2015-2011 
Who people vote for Farmer 0.3% 0.3% 0% 
won’t make any Self-employed 1.0% 0.5% -0.5% 
difference White Collar 0.3% 0.8% +0.5% 
 Worker 1.4% 3.1% +1.7% 
 Farmer 0.7% 0% -0.7% 
2 Self-employed 0.3% 0.3% 0% 
 White Collar 0.3% 0.3% 0% 
 Worker 1.0% 0.3% -0.7% 
 Farmer 1.0% 0.8% -0.2% 
3 Self-employed 1.7% 2.1% +0.4% 
 White Collar 2.8% 2.3% -0.5% 
 Worker 4.5% 4.2% -0.3% 
 Farmer 2.1% 2.3% +0.2% 
4 Self-employed 5.2% 2.6% -2.6% 
 White Collar 5.9% 3.1% -2.8% 
 Worker 13.2% 8.8% -4.4% 
Who people vote for Farmer 6.6% 4.4% -2.2% 
can make a big Self-employed 13.9% 11.7% -2.2% 
difference White Collar 15.0% 16.6% +1.4% 
 Worker 22.3% 35.6% 13.3% 
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